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THE LOGIC OF RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES
MARTA BI´LKOVA´, GIUSEPPE GRECO, ALESSANDRA PALMIGIANO, APOSTOLOS TZIMOULIS, AND NACHOEM
WIJNBERG
Abstract. We introduce the logic LRC, designed to describe and reason about agents’ abilities and capa-
bilities in using resources. The proposed framework bridges two – up to now – mutually independent strands
of literature: the one on logics of abilities and capabilities, developed within the theory of agency, and the
one on logics of resources, motivated by program semantics. The logic LRC is suitable to describe and reason
about key aspects of social behaviour in organizations. We prove a number of properties enjoyed by LRC
(soundness, completeness, canonicity, disjunction property) and its associated analytic calculus (conservativ-
ity, cut elimination and subformula property). These results lay at the intersection of the algebraic theory
of unified correspondence and the theory of multi-type calculi in structural proof theory. Case studies are
discussed which showcase several ways in which this framework can be extended and enriched while retaining
its basic properties, so as to model an array of issues, both practically and theoretically relevant, spanning
from planning problems to the logical foundations of the theory of organizations.
Keywords: display calculus, logics for organizations, multi-type calculus, algebraic proof theory.
Math. Subject Class. 2010: 03B42, 03B20, 03B60, 03B45, 03F03, 03G10, 03A99.
§1. Introduction. Organizations are social units of agents structured and managed to
meet a need, or pursue collective goals. In economics and social science, organizations are
studied in terms of agency, goals, capabilities, and inter-agent coordination [66, 70, 40]. In
strategic management, the dominant approach in the study of organizational performances is
the so-called resource-based view [73, 2, 55], which has recognized that a central role in de-
termining the success of an organization in market competition is played by the acquisition,
management, and transformation of resources within that organization. In order to capture
this insight and create the building blocks of the logical foundations of the theory of orga-
nizations, a formal framework is needed in which it is possible to express and reason about
agents’ abilities and capabilities to use resources for achieving goals, to transform resources
into other resources, and to coordinate the use of resources with other agents; i.e., a formal
framework is needed for capturing and reasoning about the resource flow within organizations.
The present paper aims at introducing such a framework.
There is extensive literature in philosophical logic and formal AI accounting for agents’ abil-
ities (cf. e.g. [27, 8]) and capabilities (cf. e.g. [71, 28, 29]) and their interaction, embedding in
the wider context of the logics of agency (cf. e.g. [9, 67, 5, 4, 10, 30]); some of these frameworks
(viz. [28, 29]) have been used to formalize some aspects of the theory of organizations. There
is also literature in theoretical computer science on the logic of resources (cf. e.g. [64, 63]),
motivated by the build-up of mathematical models of computational systems. However, these
two strands of research have been pursued independently, and in particular, the interaction
between abilities, capabilities and resources has not been explored before.
The research of the first author has been supported by the project SEGA: From Shared Evidence to Group
Agency, of the Czech Science Foundation, and DFG no. 16-07954J.
The research of the second, third and fourth author has been made possible by the NWO Vidi grant 016.138.314,
the NWO Aspasia grant 015.008.054, and a Delft Technology Fellowship awarded in 2013.
The research of the second author was also supported by the Values4Water project, subsidised by the Respon-
sible Innovation research programme, which is partly financed by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific
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The present paper introduces a logical framework, the logic of resources and capabilities
(LRC), designed as an environment for the logical modelling of the behaviour of agents mo-
tivated and mediated by the use and transformation of resources. In this framework, agents’
capabilities are not captured via primitive actions, as is done e.g. in [71], but rather via ded-
icated modalities, similarly to the frameworks adopting the STIT logic approach [5, 28, 29].
However, LRC differs from these logics in two main respects; the first is the focus on re-
sources, discussed above; the second is that, as a modal extension of intuitionistic logic, LRC
inherits its constructive character: it comes equipped with a constructive proof theory which
provides an explicit computational content brought out by the cut elimination theorem. This
guarantees that each LRC-theorem (prediction) translates into an effective procedure, thus
allowing for a greater amenability to concrete applications in planning, and paving the way
for implementations in constructive programming environments. In particular, LRC enjoys
the disjunction property, proof of which we have included in Section 2.4.
In the present paper, the basic mathematical theory of the logic of resources and capabilities
is developed in an algebraic and proof-theoretic environment. Specifically, the most important
technical tool we introduce for LRC is the proof calculus D.LRC (cf. Section 3). This calculus
is designed according to the multi-type methodology, introduced in [34, 32, 33], and further
developed in [46, 45, 36, 43]. This methodology exploits facts and insights coming from various
semantic theories: from the coalgebraic semantics of dynamic epistemic logics (cf. [42]), to the
algebraic dual of the team semantics for inquisitive logic (cf. [36]), the representation theorems
for lattices (cf. [45]), and the recently developed algebraic theory of unified correspondence
[19, 20, 16, 60, 25, 24, 23], in the context of which, systematic connections have been developed
(cf. [44, 54]) between Sahlqvist-type correspondence results and the theory of analytic rules
for proper display calculi (cf. [72]) and Gentzen calculi.
Multi-type languages make it possible to express constituents such as actions, agents, or
resources not as parameters in the generation of formulas, but as terms in their own right.
They thus are regarded as first-class citizens of the multi-type framework, and are endowed
with their corresponding structural connectives and rules. In this rich environment, it is
possible to encode certain key interactions within the language, by means of structural analytic
rules. This approach has made it possible to develop analytic calculi for logics notoriously
impervious to the standard proof-theoretic treatment, such as Public Announcement Logic
[62], Dynamic Epistemic Logic [1], their nonclassical counterparts [53, 51], and PDL [48].
One of the most important benefits of multi-type calculi is the degree of modularity for which
they allow. When applied to the present setting, the metatheory of multi-type calculi makes
it possible to add (resp. remove) analytic structural rules to (resp. from) the basic calculus
D.LRC, and obtain variants endowed with a package of basic properties (soundness, com-
pleteness, cut-elimination, subformula property, conservativity) as immediate consequences
of general results. This feature is illustrated and exploited in Section 5, where we specialize
D.LRC to various situations by adding certain analytic structural rules to it. More in general,
an infinite class of axiomatic extensions and combinatoric variants of LRC can be captured in
a systematic way within this framework. Hence, LRC can be regarded not just as one single
logic, but as a class of interconnected logical systems. Besides being of theoretical interest,
this feature is of great usefulness in practice, since this class of logics forms a coherent frame-
work which can be adapted to very different concrete settings with minimum effort. The
combined strengths of this class of logics make the resulting LRC framework into a viable
proposal for capturing and reasoning about the resource flow within organizations.
Finally, LRC is the first example of a logical system designed from first principles according
to the multi-type methodology. As this example shows, multi-type calculi can serve not only
to provide existing logics with well-performing calculi, but also as a methodological platform
for the analysis and the meta-design of new logical frameworks.
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Structure of the paper. In Section 2.1, the logic LRC is introduced by means of a Hilbert-style
presentation, which is shown to be complete w.r.t. certain algebraic models (cf. Section 2.2),
canonical (cf. Section 2.3) and to enjoy the disjunction property (cf. Section 2.4). Then, in
Section 3, the multi-type calculus D.LRC is introduced, and is shown to be sound w.r.t. the
algebraic models (cf. Section 4.1), complete (cf. Section 4.2), and conservative (cf. Section
4.4) w.r.t. the Hilbert-style presentation introduced in Section 2.1. In Section 4.3, we prove
that the calculus D.LRC satisfies the assumptions of the cut-elimination metatheorem proven
in [33], and hence enjoys cut-elimination and subformula property. In Section 5, we start
exploring various ways in which D.LRC can be modified and adapted to different contexts so
that the resulting systems retain all the properties enjoyed by the basic system. Specifically,
Section 5.1 illustrates how coordination among agents helps optimizing capabilities towards
a goal; Section 5.2 explores the solution of a planning problem which requires the suitable
concatenation of reusable and non-reusable resources; Section 5.3 focuses on a situation in
which the possibility of resources to be used in different roles becomes relevant; Section 5.4
illustrates how the resilience of a fragment of a system can propagate to the system as a
whole.
§2. The logic of resources and capabilities and its algebraic semantics.
2.1. Hilbert-style presentation of LRC. As mentioned in the introduction, the key idea
is to introduce a language in which resources are not accounted for as parameters indexing
the capability connectives, but as logical terms in their own right. Accordingly, we start by
defining a multi-type language in which the different types interact via special connectives.
The present setting consists of the types Res for resources and Fm for formulas (describing
states of affairs). We stipulate that Res and Fm are disjoint.
Similarly to the binary connectives introduced in [34], the connectives B , 3 and B (referred
to as heterogeneous connectives) facilitate the interaction between resources and formulas:1
B : Res× Fm→ Fm B : Res× Res→ Fm
3 : Fm→ Fm 3 : Res→ Fm
As discussed in the next section, the mathematical environment of heterogeneous LRC-
algebras provides a natural interpretation for all these connectives. Let us introduce the
language of the logic of resources and capabilities. Let AtProp and AtRes be countable and
disjoint sets of atomic propositions and atomic resources, respectively. The set R = R(AtRes)
of the resource-terms α over AtRes, and the set L = L(R,AtProp) of the formula-terms A
over R and AtProp of the Logic of Resources and Capabilities (LRC) are defined as follows:
α ::= a ∈ AtRes | 1 | 0 | α · α | α unionsq α | α u α,
A ::= p ∈ AtProp | > | ⊥ | A ∨A | A ∧A | A→ A | αBA | 3A | 3α | αBα.
When writing formulas, we will omit brackets whenever the functional type of the connectives
allows for a unique reading. Hence, for instance, we will write αB (3A) as αB3A and
(α ·β)BA as α ·βBA. We will also abide by the convention that ∨, ∧, 3, 3 , B and B bind
more strongly than →, that 3, 3 , B and B bind more strongly than ∨ and ∧, and that ↔
is a weaker binder than any other connective. With this convention, for instance, αBA ∧ B
has the same reading as (αBA) ∧B.
1As discussed below, these modal operators intend to capture agents’ abilities and capabilities vis-a`-vis re-
sources; in this section, for the sake of a simpler exposition, we present the single-agent version of LRC, where
any explicit mention of the agent is omitted.
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The (single-agent version of the) logic of resources and capabilities LRC, in its Hilbert-style
presentation H.LRC, is defined as the smallest set of formulas containing the axioms and rules
of intuitionistic propositional logic2 plus the following axiom schemas:
Pure-resource entailment schemas
R1. unionsq and u are commutative, associative, idempotent, and distribute over each other;
R2. · is associative with unit 1;
R3. α ` 1 and 0 ` α
R4. α · (β unionsq γ) ` (α · β) unionsq (α · γ) and (β unionsq γ) · α ` (β · α) unionsq (γ · α).
Axiom schemas for 3 and 3
D1. 3(A ∨B)↔ 3A ∨3B D3. 3 (α unionsq β)↔ 3α ∨3β
D2. 3⊥ ↔ ⊥ D4. 30↔ ⊥
Axiom schemas for B and B
B1. (α unionsq β)BA↔ αBA ∧ βBA B4. (α unionsq β)Bγ ↔ αBγ ∧ βBγ
B2. 0BA B5. 0Bα
B3. αBβBA→ α · βBA B6. αB(β u γ)↔ αBβ ∧ αBγ
B7. αB1
Interaction axiom schemas
BD1. 3α ∧ αBA→ 3A
BD2. αBβ → αB3β
and closed under modus ponens, uniform substitution and the following rules:
α ` β
MF
α · γ ` β · γ
A ` B
MB
αBA ` αBB
A ` B
MD
3A ` 3B
α ` β
MB’
γBα ` γBβ
α ` β
MF’
γ · α ` γ · β
α ` β
AB
βBA ` αBA
α ` β
MD’
3α ` 3β
α ` β
AB’
βBγ ` αBγ
Finally, for all A,B ∈ L, we let A `LRC B iff a proof of B exists in H.LRC which possibly
uses A.
Let us expand on the intuitive meaning of the connectives, axioms and rules introduced
above, and their formal properties.
The pure-resource fragment of LRC.. The pure-resource fragment of the logic LRC is inspired
by (distributive) linear logic.3 Indeed, as is witnessed by conditions R1-R4 and rules MF and
MF’, the algebraic behaviour of u (with unit 1), unionsq (with unit 0) and · (with unit 1) is that of
the additive conjunction, additive disjunction and multiplicative conjunction in (distributive)
linear logic, respectively. The intuitive understanding of the difference between α ·β and αuβ
is also borrowed from linear logic (cf. [41, Section 1.1.2]): indeed, α · β can be intuitively
understood as the resource obtained by putting α and β together. This ‘putting resources
together’ can be interpreted in many ways in different contexts: one of them is e.g. when
α (water) and β (flour) are mixed together to obtain α · β (dough); another is e.g. when α
(water) and β (flour), juxtaposed in separate jars, are used at the same time so to form the
counterweight α · β to keep something in balance. Notice that under both interpretations,
2The classical propositional logic counterpart of LRC can be obtained as usual by adding e.g. excluded middle
to the present axiomatization. Notice that classical propositional base is not needed in any of the case studies
of Section 5.
3However, the conceptual distinction is worth being stressed that, while formulas in linear logic behave like
resources, pure-resource terms of LRC literally denote resources. In this respect, the pure-resource fragment
of LRC is similar to the logic of resources introduced in [63, 64].
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α · α is distinct from α. We understand α u β as the resource which is as powerful as α and
β taken separately. In other words, if we identify any resource γ with the (upward-closed) set
of the states of affairs which can be brought about using γ (for brevity let us call such set
the power of γ), then the resource αu β is uniquely identified by the union of the power of α
and the power of β. Finally, we understand α unionsq β as the resource the power of which is the
intersection of the power of α and the power of β. More in general, the intended meaning
of the resource-type entailment α ` β (namely ‘α is at least as powerful a resource as β’),
together with the identification of the lattice of resources with the lattice of their powers
(which is a lattice of sets closed under union and intersection and hence distributive), explain
intuitively the validity of resource-type entailments such as αuα a` α, αunionsqα a` α, α ` αunionsqβ
and β ` α unionsq β, as well as α u (β unionsq γ) ` (α u β) unionsq (α u γ) and (α unionsq β) u (α unionsq γ) ` α unionsq (β u γ).
Moreover, under this reading of `, by R3, the bottom 0 and top 1 of the lattice of resources can
respectively be understood as the resource that is at least as powerful as any other resource
(hence 0 is impossibly powerful), and the resource any other resource, no matter how weak,
is at least as powerful as (hence 1 is the resource with no power, or the empty resource).
This intuition, together with the uniqueness of the neutral element, also justifies one of the
main differences between this setting and general linear logic; namely, the fact that the unit
of · is the unit of u. Indeed, it seems intuitively plausible that, under the most common
interpretations of ·, putting together (e.g. mixing or juxtaposing) the empty resource and any
resource α yields α as outcome.4 Our inability to distinguish between the units of u and of
· yields as a consequence that the following entailments hold, which are also valid in linear
affine logic [49, 50]
α · β ` α and α · β ` β.(2.1)
Indeed, by R3, R2 and MF’, α · β ` α · 1 ` α, and the second entailment goes likewise.
This restricts the scope of applications of the present setting: for instance, the fact that the
compound resource α · β must be at least as powerful as its two components rules out the
general examples of e.g. those chemical reactions in which the compound and its components
are resources of incomparable power. On the other hand, it includes the case of all resources
which can be quantified: two 50 euros bills are at least as powerful a resource than each 50
euros bill; two hours of time are at least as powerful a resource than one hour time, and
so on. Moreover, this restriction does not rule out the possibility that the power of α · β
be strictly greater than the union of the separate powers of α and β (which is the power of
α u β). This is the case for instance when a critical mass of fuel is needed for reaching a
certain temperature, or a certain outcome (e.g. a nuclear chain reaction). Another difference
between the pure-resource fragment of LRC and linear logic is that, in LRC, the connective ·
is not necessarily commutative.
The modal operators. The intended meaning of the formulas 3A and 3α is ‘the agent is able
to bring about state of affairs A’ and ‘the agent is in possession of resource α’, respectively. By
axioms D1 and D2 (resp. D3 and D4), the connective 3 (resp. 3 ) is a normal diamond-type
connective (i.e. its algebraic interpretation is finitely join-preserving). Axiom D1 expresses
that being able to bring about A ∨ B is tantamount to either being able to bring about A
or being able to bring about B. Axiom D2 encodes the fact that the agent can never bring
about logical contradictions. Analogously, Axiom D3 says that the agent is in possession of
αunionsq β exactly in case is in possession of α or is in possession of β. Axiom D4 encodes the fact
that the agent is never in possession of the ‘impossibly powerful resource’ 0.
4 This is one of the main differences between actions and resources: the idle action skip, represented as the
identity relation, is the unit of the product operation on actions, and is clearly different from the top element
in the lattice of actions (the total relation).
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The intended meaning of the formula αBA is ‘whenever resource α is in possession of the
agent, using α the agent is capable to bring about A’. By axioms B1 and B2, the connective B
is an antitone normal box-type operator in the first coordinate (i.e. its algebraic interpretation
is finitely join-reversing in that coordinate). Axiom B1 says that the agent is capable of
bringing about A whenever in possession of α unionsq β iff the agent is capable of bringing about
A both whenever in possession of α and whenever in possession of β. Axiom B2 means that
if the agent were in possession of the impossibly powerful resource (which is never the case
by D4), the agent could bring about any state of affairs. The justification of axiom B3 is
connected with the constraint, encoded in (2.1), that the fusion α · β of two resources is at
least as powerful as each of its components. Taking this fact into account, let us assume that
the agent is in possession of α · β. Hence, by (2.1), the resource in its possession is at least as
powerful as the resources α and β taken in isolation. If αBβBA is the case, then by using
α ·β up to α, the agent can bring about βBA, and by using the remainder of α ·β, the agent
can bring about A, which motivates B3. However, the converse direction is arguably not
valid. Indeed, let α · βBA express the fact that a certain temperature is reached by burning
a critical mass α · β of fuel. However, burning α and then β in sequence might not be enough
to reach the same temperature.5
The intended meaning of the formula αBβ is ‘the agent is capable of getting β from α,
whenever in possession of α’. By axioms B4 and B5, the connective B is an antitone nor-
mal box-type operator in the first coordinate (i.e. its algebraic interpretation is finitely join-
reversing in that coordinate). Axiom B4 says that the agent is capable of getting resource γ
whenever in possession of α unionsq β iff the agent is capable of getting resource γ both whenever
in possession of α and whenever in possession of β. Axiom B5 says that if the agent were in
possession of the impossibly powerful resource (which is never the case by D4), the agent could
get any resource. By axioms B6 and B7, the connective B is a monotone normal box-type
operator in the second coordinate (i.e. its algebraic interpretation is finitely meet-preserving in
that coordinate). Axiom B6 says that the agent is capable of getting resource β u γ whenever
in possession of α iff the agent is capable of getting both β and γ whenever in possession of α.
Axiom B7 says that any agent is capable to get the empty resource whenever in possession of
any resource.
Axiom BD1 encodes the link between the agent’s capabilities and abilities: indeed, it ex-
presses the fact that if the agent is capable to bring about A whenever in possession of α
(αBA), and moreover the agent is actually in possession of α (3α), then the agent is able to
bring about A (3A). Notice also the analogy between this axiom and the intuitionistic axiom
A ∧ (A → B) ↔ A ∧ B. Axiom BD2 establishes a link between B and B, via 3 ; indeed, it
says that the agent’s being capable to get β implies that the agent is capable to bring about
a state of affairs in which the agent is in possession of β.
The rules MB and AB (resp. MB’ and AB’) encode the fact that B (resp. B) is monotone
in its second coordinate and antitone in its first. In fact, AB, MB’ and AB’ can be derived
using B1, B4 and B6. The monotonicity of B in its second coordinate expresses the intuition
that if the agent is capable, whenever in possession of α, to bring about A, then is capable to
bring about any state of affairs which is logically implied by A. The remaining rules encode
the monotonicity of 3, 3 and ·.
Some additional axioms. We conclude the present discussion by mentioning some analytic
axioms which might perhaps be interesting for different settings. We start mentioning 3>,
31, and αB>, respectively stating that the agent is able to bring about what is always the
5There is a surface similarity between B3 and Axiom Ac4 of [71, Section 4], which captures the interaction
between the capabilities of agents to perform actions and composition of actions; however, as remarked in
Footnote 4, composition of actions behaves differently from composition of resources, which is why B3 is an
implication and not a bi-implication.
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case, such as logical tautologies; the agent is in possession of the empty resource; the agent is
capable of using any resource (hence also the empty one) to bring about what is always the
case. We also mention αBα, stating that the agent is capable to get any resource already
in the possession of the agent; 3α ∧ αBβ → 3β, and 3α ∧ αBβ → 33β. The latter is
a consequence of BD1 and BD2, while the former is used in the case study in Section 5.4.
For the sake of achieving greater generality we chose not to include it in the general system.
Axioms which might also be considered in special settings are αB (A ∨B)→ αBA ∨ αBB,
and αBA ∧ αBB → αB (A ∧ B). The first one would imply the distributivity of B over
disjunction in its second coordinate. The axiom αBA∧αBB → αB (A∧B) is not applicable
in general, given that the consequence would require the duplication of the resource α. More
generally applicable variants are αBA ∧ αBB → α · αB (A ∧ B) and αBβ ∧ αBγ →
α · αB(β · γ). The latter encodes the behaviour of scalable resources, and will be used in the
case study of Sections 5.2 and 5.4. Another interesting axiom is the converse of B3, which we
have discussed above.
2.2. Algebraic completeness. In the present section we outline the completeness of
LRC w.r.t. the heterogeneous LRC-algebras6 defined below, via a Lindenbaum-Tarski type
construction.
Definition 2.1. A heterogeneous LRC-algebra is a tuple F = (A,Q, B ,3, B,3 ) such
that A is a Heyting algebra, Q = (Q,unionsq,u, ·, 0, 1) is a bounded distributive lattice with binary
operator · which preserves finite joins in each coordinate and the unit of which is 1,7 and
B : Q × A → A, 3 : A → A, B : Q × Q → A, 3 : Q → A verify the (quasi-)inequalities
corresponding to the axioms and rules of LRC as presented in the previous section. A het-
erogeneous LRC-algebra is perfect if both A and Q are perfect,8 and the operations B , 3,
B, and 3 satisfy the infinitary versions of the join- and meet-preservation properties sat-
isfied by definition in any heterogeneous LRC-algebra. An algebraic LRC-model is a tuple
M := (F, vFm, vRes) such that F is a heterogeneous LRC-algebra, vFm : AtProp → A and
vRes : AtRes → Q. Clearly, for every algebraic LRC-model M, the assignments vFm and vRes
have unique homomorphic extensions which we identify with vFm and vRes respectively. For
each T ∈ {Fm,Res} and all terms a, b of type T, we let a |=LRC b iff vT(a) ≤ vT(b) for every
model M.
Given AtProp and AtRes, the Lindenbaum-Tarski heterogeneous LRC-algebra over AtProp
and AtRes is defined to be the following structure:
F ? := (A?,Q?, B?,3?, B?,3?)
where:
1. A? is the quotient algebra Fm/a`, where Fm is the formula algebra corresponding to the
language L defined in the previous subsection, and a` is the equivalence relation on Fm
defined as A a` A′ iff A ` A′ and A′ ` A. Notice that the rules MD, MB,AB, MD’,
MB’ and AB’ guarantee that a` is compatible with 3, B , 3 and B, hence the quotient
algebra construction is well defined. The elements of A? will be typically denoted [B] for
some formula B ∈ L;
6This notion specializes the more general notion of heterogeneous algebras introduced in [6] to the setting of
interest of the present paper.
7It immediately follows from the definition that α · β ≤ α and α · β ≤ β for all α, β ∈ Q.
8 A bounded distributive lattice (BDL) is perfect if it is complete, completely distributive and completely
join-generated by its completely join-irreducible elements. A BDL is perfect iff it is isomorphic to the lattice of
the upward-closed subsets of some poset. A Heyting algebra is perfect if its lattice reduct is a perfect BDL. A
bounded distributive lattice with operators (abbreviated DLO. Operators are additional operations which are
finitely join-preserving in each coordinate) is perfect if its lattice reduct is a perfect BDL, and each operator is
completely join-preserving in each coordinate.
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2. Q? is the quotient algebra Res/a`, where Res is the resource algebra corresponding to
the language R defined in the previous subsection, and a` is the equivalence relation
on Res defined as α a` α′ iff α ` α′ and α′ ` α. Notice that the rules MF and MF’
guarantee that a` is compatible with ·, hence the quotient algebra construction is well
defined. The elements of Q? will be typically denoted [α] for some resource α ∈ R;
3. B? : Q? × A? → A? is defined as [α]B?[B] := [αBB];
4. 3? : A? → A? is defined as 3?[B] := [3B];
5. B? : Q? ×Q? → A? is defined as [α1]B?[α2] := [α1Bα2];
6. 3? : Q? → A? is defined as 3?[α] := [3α];
Lemma 2.2. For any AtProp and AtRes, F ? is a heterogeneous LRC-algebra.
Proof. It is a standard verification that A? is a Heyting algebra and that Q? is a bounded
distributive lattice with binary operator · which preserves finite joins in each coordinate and
the unit of which is 1. It is also an easy verification that B?, 3?, B? and 3? are well-defined,
and verify the additional conditions by construction. a
The canonical assignments can be defined as usual, i.e. mapping atomic propositions and
resources to their canonical value in F ?. Let M∗ be the resulting LRC-algebraic model. With
this definition, the proof of the following proposition is routine, and is omitted.
Proposition 2.3. For all X ⊆ L and A ∈ L, if X 6`LRC A, then X 6|=LRC A.
2.3. Algebraic canonicity. The present subsection is aimed at showing that LRC is
strongly complete w.r.t. perfect heterogeneous LRC-algebras. This will be a key ingredient in
the conservativity proof of Section 4.4.
Definition 2.4. Let F = (A,Q, B ,3, B,3 ) be a heterogeneous LRC-algebra. The canon-
ical extension of F is
F δ = (Aδ,Qδ, Bpi,3σ, Bpi,3σ),
where Aδ and Qδ are the canonical extensions of A and Q respectively9, the operations 3σ :
Qδ → Aδ and Bpi : Qδ × Qδ → Aδ and 3σ : Aδ → Aδ and Bpi : Qδ × Aδ → Aδ are defined as
follows: for any k ∈ K(Aδ), κ ∈ K(Qδ) and o ∈ O(Aδ), ω ∈ O(Qδ),10
3σκ :=
∧
{3α | α ∈ Q and κ ≤ α} κBpiω :=
∨
{αBβ | β ∈ Q, β ≤ ω, α ∈ Q and κ ≤ α},
3σk :=
∧
{3a | a ∈ A and k ≤ a} κBpio :=
∨
{αB a | a ∈ A, a ≤ o, α ∈ Q and κ ≤ α},
and for any u ∈ Aδ and q, w ∈ Qδ,
9 The canonical extension of a BDL L is a complete distributive lattice Lδ containing L as a sublattice, such
that:
1. (denseness) every element of Lδ can be expressed both as a join of meets and as a meet of joins of elements
from L;
2. (compactness) for all S, T ⊆ L, if ∧S ≤ ∨T in Lδ, then ∧F ≤ ∨G for some finite sets F ⊆ S and G ⊆ T .
It is well known that the canonical extension of a BDL is a perfect BDL (cf. Footnote 8). Completeness and
complete distributivity imply that each perfect BDL is naturally endowed with a Heyting algebra structure,
and hence each perfect BDL is also a perfect Heyting algebra. Moreover, if L is the lattice reduct of some
Heyting algebra A, then A is a subalgebra of Lδ, seen as a perfect Heyting algebra. The canonical extension Aδ
of a Heyting algebra A is defined as the canonical extension of the lattice reduct of A endowed with its natural
Heyting algebra structure. The canonical extension Qδ of a DLO Q is defined as the canonical extension of
the lattice reduct of Q endowed with the σ-extension of each additional operator. It is well known that the
canonical extension of a Heyting algebra (resp. DLO) is a perfect Heyting algebra (resp. DLO).
10For any BDL L, an element k ∈ Lδ (resp. o ∈ Lδ) is closed (resp. open) if is the meet (resp. join) of some
subset of L. The set of closed (resp. open) elements of Lδ is K(Lδ) (resp. O(Lδ)). We will slightly abuse
notation and write K(Aδ) (resp. O(Aδ)) and K(Qδ) (resp. O(Qδ)) to refer to the sets of closed and open
elements of their lattice reducts.
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3σq :=
∨{3σκ | κ ∈ K(Qδ) and κ ≤ q}
qBpiw :=
∧{κBpiω | ω ∈ O(Qδ), w ≤ ω, κ ∈ K(Qδ) and κ ≤ q}
3σu :=
∨{3σk | k ∈ K(Aδ) and k ≤ u}
qBpiu :=
∧{κBpio | o ∈ O(Aδ), u ≤ o, κ ∈ K(Qδ) and κ ≤ q}.
Below we also report the definition of ·σ for the reader’s convenience: For κ1, κ2 ∈ K(Qδ)
κ1 ·σ κ2 =
∧
{α · β | α, β ∈ Q and κ1 ≤ α, κ2 ≤ β},
and for any q1, q2 ∈ Qδ
q1 ·σ q2 =
∨
{κ1 ·σ κ2 | κ1, κ2 ∈ K(Qδ) and κ1 ≤ q1, κ2 ≤ q2}.
In what follows, for the sake of readability, we will write ·σ without the superscript. This will
not create ambiguities, since we use different variables to denote the elements of Q, K(Qδ),
O(Qδ) and Qδ, and since · and ·σ coincide over Q.
Lemma 2.5. For any heterogeneous LRC-algebra F , the canonical extension F δ is a perfect
heterogeneous LRC-algebra.
Proof. As discussed in Footnote 9, Aδ is a perfect Heyting algebra and Qδ is a perfect
DLO, so to finish the proof it is enough to show that the validity of all axioms and rules
of LRC transfers from F to F δ, and moreover, the join-and meet-preservation properties of
the operations of F hold in their infinitary versions in F δ. Conditions R2 hold in Qδ as
consequences of the general theory of canonicity of terms purely built on operators (cf. [38,
Theorem 4.6]). As to D1 and D2, by assumption the operation 3 preserves finite joins. Hence,
by a well known fact of the theory of the σ-extensions of finitely join-preserving maps, 3σ
preserves arbitrary joins (cf. [38, Theorem 3.2]). The same argument applies to D3, D4, B4,
B5, B6, B7. Furthermore, by [39, Lemma 2.22] it follows that Bpi turns arbitrary joins into
arbitrary meets in the first coordinate, which is the infinitary version of B1.
As to axiom B2, it is enough to show that for every u ∈ Aδ,
0Bpiu = >.
Let us preliminarily show the identity above for o ∈ O(Aδ). Notice that the set {a | a ∈
A, a ≤ o} is always nonempty since ⊥ belongs to it. Hence,
0Bpio =
∨{0B a | a ∈ A, a ≤ o}
=
∨{> | a ∈ A, a ≤ o}
= >.
Hence, for arbitrary u ∈ Aδ
0Bpiu =
∧{0Bpio | o ∈ O(Aδ), u ≤ o}
=
∧{> | o ∈ O(Aδ), u ≤ o}
= >.
As to B3, let us show that for all q, w ∈ Qδ and u ∈ Aδ,
qBpiwBpiu ≤ q · wBpiu.
Let us preliminarily show that the inequality above is true for any o ∈ O(Aδ), κ1, κ2 ∈ K(Qδ).
By definition, if o ∈ O(Aδ) and κ1, κ2 ∈ K(Qδ) then κ2Bpio ∈ O(Aδ) and κ1 · κ2 ∈ K(Qδ).
Therefore:
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κ1Bpiκ2Bpio
=
∨{αB a | a ∈ A, α ∈ Q, κ1 ≤ α, a ≤ κ2Bpio} (by definition)
=
∨{αB a | a ∈ A, α ∈ Q, κ1 ≤ α, a ≤ ∨{βB b | b ∈ A, b ≤ o, β ∈ Q, κ2 ≤ β}} (by definition)
=
∨{αBβB a | a ∈ A, a ≤ o, α, β ∈ Q, κ1 ≤ α, κ2 ≤ β} (∗)
≤ ∨{α · βB a | a ∈ A, a ≤ o, α, β ∈ Q, κ1 ≤ α, κ2 ≤ β} (B3 holds in A)
≤ ∨{γB a | a ∈ A, a ≤ o, γ ∈ Q, κ1 · κ2 ≤ γ} (∗∗)
= κ1 · κ2Bpio (by definition)
Let us prove the equality marked with (∗). If a ∈ A, β ∈ Q, a ≤ o and κ ≤ β, then βB a ∈ A
and βB a ∈ {βB b | b ∈ A, b ≤ o, β ∈ Q, κ2 ≤ β}, hence βB a ≤
∨{βB b | b ∈ A, b ≤ o, β ∈
Q, κ2 ≤ β}. This, in turn, implies that
αBβB a ∈ {αB a | a ∈ A, α ∈ Q, κ1 ≤ α, a ≤
∨
{βB b | b ∈ A, b ≤ o, β ∈ Q, κ2 ≤ β}}.
Therefore
{αBβB a | a ∈ A, a ≤ o, α, β ∈ Q, κ1 ≤ α, κ2 ≤ β}
⊆ {αB a | a ∈ A, α ∈ Q, κ1 ≤ α, a ≤
∨{βB b | b ∈ A, b ≤ o, β ∈ Q, κ2 ≤ β}}
and thus ∨{αBβB a | a ∈ A, a ≤ o, α, β ∈ Q, κ1 ≤ α, κ2 ≤ β}
≤ ∨{αB a | a ∈ A, α ∈ Q, κ1 ≤ α, a ≤ ∨{βB b | b ∈ A, b ≤ o, β ∈ Q, κ2 ≤ β}}.
To prove the converse inequality, it is enough to show that if a ∈ A and a ≤ ∨{βB b | b ∈
A, b ≤ o, β ∈ Q, κ2 ≤ β}, then αB a ≤ αBβB b for some b ∈ A such that b ≤ o and some
β ∈ Q such that κ2 ≤ β. By compactness (cf. Footnote 9), a ≤
∨{βB b | b ∈ A, b ≤ o, β ∈
Q, κ2 ≤ β} implies that a ≤
∨{βiB bi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} for some bi ∈ A, βi ∈ Q such that bi ≤ o,
κ2 ≤ βi for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since B is monotone in its second coordinate and antitone in
its first, this implies that
a ≤ β1B b1 ∨ . . . ∨ βnB bn ≤ (β1 u . . . u βn)B (b1 ∨ . . . ∨ bn).
Let b := b1 ∨ . . . ∨ bn and β = β1 u . . . u βn. By definition, b ∈ A, β ∈ Q and b ≤ o, κ2 ≤ β.
Moreover, again by monotonicity, the displayed inequality implies that αB a ≤ αBβB b, as
required. This finishes the proof of (∗). The inequality marked with (∗∗) holds since if κ1 ≤ α
and κ2 ≤ β then κ1 · κ2 ≤ α · β, so α · βB a ∈ {γB a | a ∈ A, a ≤ o, γ ∈ Q, κ1 · κ2 ≤ γ} and
therefore
{α ·βB a | a ∈ A, a ≤ o, α, β ∈ Q, κ1 ≤ α, κ2 ≤ β} ⊆ {γB a | a ∈ A, a ≤ o, γ ∈ Q, κ1 ·κ2 ≤ γ}.
Let us show that B3 holds for arbitrary u ∈ Aδ and q, w ∈ Qδ.
qBpiwBpiu
=
∧{κ1Bpio | o ∈ O(Aδ), κ1 ∈ K(Qδ), κ1 ≤ q, wBpiu ≤ o} (by definition)
=
∧{κ1Bpio | o ∈ O(Aδ), κ1 ∈ K(Qδ), κ1 ≤ q,∧{κ2Bpio′ | u ≤ o′, κ2 ≤ w} ≤ o} (by definition)
≤ ∧{κ1Bpiκ2Bpio | o ∈ O(Aδ), u ≤ o, κ1, κ2 ∈ K(Qδ), κ1 ≤ q, κ2 ≤ w} (∗ ∗ ∗)
≤ ∧{κ1 · κ2Bpio | o ∈ O(Aδ), u ≤ o, κ1, κ2 ∈ K(Qδ), κ1 ≤ q, κ2 ≤ w} (†)
=
∧{(∨{κ1 · κ2 | κ1, κ2 ∈ K(Qδ), κ1 ≤ q, κ2 ≤ w}) Bpio | o ∈ O(Aδ), u ≤ o} (‡)
=
∧{q · wBpio | o ∈ O(Aδ), u ≤ o} (by definition)
= q · wBpiu (by definition)
The inequality marked with (∗ ∗ ∗) holds since, for any o ∈ O(Aδ) and κ ∈ K(Qδ), if u ≤ o
and κ ≤ w then κBpio ∈ O(Aδ) and κBpio ∈ {κ2Bpio′ | u ≤ o′, κ2 ≤ w}, hence
∧{κ2Bpio′ | u ≤
o′, κ2 ≤ w} ≤ κBpio. This implies that
κ1Bpiκ2Bpio ∈ {κ1Bpio | o ∈ O(Aδ), κ1 ∈ K(Qδ), κ1 ≤ q,
∧
{κ2Bpio′ | u ≤ o′, κ2 ≤ w} ≤ o}
and therefore
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{κ1Bpiκ2Bpio | o ∈ O(Aδ), u ≤ o, κ1, κ2 ∈ K(Qδ), κ1 ≤ q, κ2 ≤ w}
⊆ {κ1Bpio | o ∈ O(Aδ), κ1 ∈ K(Qδ), κ1 ≤ q,
∧{κ2Bpio′ | u ≤ o′, κ2 ≤ w} ≤ o}
which implies that∧{κ1Bpio | o ∈ O(Aδ), κ1 ∈ K(Qδ), κ1 ≤ q,∧{κ2Bpio′ | u ≤ o′, κ2 ≤ w} ≤ o}
≤ ∧{κ1Bpiκ2Bpio | o ∈ O(Aδ), u ≤ o, κ1, κ2 ∈ K(Qδ), κ1 ≤ q, κ2 ≤ w}.
The inequality marked with (†) holds since as we showed above B3 holds for any o ∈ O(Aδ),
κ1, κ2 ∈ K(Qδ). The equality marked with (‡) holds because Bpi is completely join reversing
in the first coordinate.
As to axiom BD1, let us show that for any q ∈ Qδ and u ∈ Aδ,
3σq ∧ qBpiu ≤ 3σu.
Let us preliminarily show that the inequality above is true for any o ∈ O(Aδ) and κ ∈ K(Qδ):
3σκ ∧ κBpio
=
∧{3β | β ∈ Q, κ ≤ β} ∧∨{αB a | a ∈ A, a ≤ o, α ∈ Q, κ ≤ α} (by definition)
=
∨{(∧{3β | β ∈ Q, κ ≤ β}) ∧ αB a | a ∈ A, a ≤ o} (distributivity)
≤ ∨{3α ∧ αB a | a ∈ A, a ≤ o} (∗)
≤ ∨{3a | a ∈ A, a ≤ o} (BD2 holds in A)
= 3σ
∨{a | a ∈ A, a ≤ o} (3σ is completely join-preserving)
= 3σo. (by definition)
The inequality marked with (∗) holds because if κ ≤ α, then 3α ∈ {3β | β ∈ Q, κ ≤ β} and
therefore
∧{3β | β ∈ Q, κ ≤ β} ≤ 3α. Let us show the inequality for arbitrary u ∈ Aδ and
q ∈ Qδ. In what follows, let  denote the right adjoint of 3σ. It is well known (cf. [21, Lemma
10.3.3]) that o ∈ O(Aδ) for any o ∈ O(Aδ).
3σq ∧ qBpiu
=
∨{3σκ | κ ∈ K(Qδ), κ ≤ q} ∧∧{κ′Bpio | o ∈ O(Aδ), u ≤ o, κ′ ∈ K(Qδ), κ′ ≤ q} (by definition)
=
∨{3σκ ∧∧{κ′Bpio | o ∈ O(Aδ), u ≤ o, κ′ ∈ K(Qδ), κ′ ≤ q} | κ ∈ K(Qδ), κ ≤ q} (distributivity)
≤ ∨{3σκ ∧∧{κBpio | o ∈ O(Aδ), u ≤ o} | κ ∈ K(Qδ), κ ≤ q} (∗)
≤ ∨{3σκ ∧∧{κBpio | o ∈ O(Aδ), u ≤ o} | κ ∈ K(Qδ), κ ≤ q} (o ∈ O(Aδ))
≤ ∨{∧{3σκ ∧ κBpio | o ∈ O(Aδ), u ≤ o} | κ ∈ K(Qδ), κ ≤ q} (distributivity)
≤ ∨{∧{3σo | o ∈ O(Aδ), u ≤ o} | κ ∈ K(Qδ), κ ≤ q} (BD2 holds in O(Aδ))
=
∧{3σo | o ∈ O(Aδ), u ≤ o} (3σo does not contain κ)
≤ ∧{o ∈ O(Aδ) | u ≤ o} (3σo ≤ o)
=
∧{o ∈ O(Aδ) | 3σu ≤ o} (by adjunction)
= 3σu. (by denseness)
The inequality marked with (∗) holds because if κ ≤ q and u ≤ o, then
κBpio ∈ {κ′Bpio | o ∈ O(Aδ), u ≤ o, κ′ ∈ K(Qδ), κ′ ≤ q}
and therefore
{κBpio | o ∈ O(Aδ), u ≤ o} ⊆ {κ′Bpio | o ∈ O(Aδ), u ≤ o, κ′ ∈ K(Qδ), κ′ ≤ q}
which yields∧
{κ′Bpio | o ∈ O(Aδ), u ≤ o, κ′ ∈ K(Qδ), κ′ ≤ q} ≤
∧
{κBpio | o ∈ O(Aδ), u ≤ o}.
Finally for axiom BD2 let us show that for any q, w ∈ Qδ,
qBpiw ≤ qBpi3σw.
Let us preliminarily show that the inequality above is true for any ω ∈ O(Qδ) and κ ∈ K(Qδ).
Notice that since 3σ is completely join preserving, if ω ∈ O(Qδ) then 3σω ∈ O(Aδ).
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κBpiω
=
∨{αBβ | α, β ∈ Q, κ ≤ α, β ≤ ω} (by definition)
=
∨{αB3β | α, β ∈ Q, κ ≤ α, β ≤ ω} (BD2 holds in A)
≤ ∨{αB a | α ∈ Q, a ∈ A, κ ≤ α, a ≤ 3σω} (∗)
= κBpi3σω (by definition)
The inequality marked with (∗) holds because if β ≤ ω then 3β ≤ 3σω, thus if κ ≤ α we
have
αB3β ∈ {αB a | α ∈ Q, a ∈ A, κ ≤ α, a ≤ 3σω}
and therefore
{αB3β | α, β ∈ Q, κ ≤ α, β ≤ ω} ⊆ {αB a | α ∈ Q, a ∈ A, κ ≤ α, a ≤ 3σω}.
Let us show the inequality for arbitrary q, w ∈ Qδ. In what follows, let  : Aδ → Qδ denote
the right adjoint of 3σ.
qBpiw
=
∧{κBpiω | κ ∈ K(Qδ), ω ∈ O(Qδ), κ ≤ q, w ≤ ω} (by definition)
≤ ∧{κBpio | κ ∈ K(Qδ), o ∈ O(Aδ), κ ≤ q, w ≤ o} (o ∈ O(Qδ))
≤ ∧{κBpi3σo | κ ∈ K(Qδ), o ∈ O(Aδ), κ ≤ q, w ≤ o} (BD2 holds for ω ∈ O(Qδ) and κ ∈ K(Qδ))
≤ ∧{κBpio | κ ∈ K(Qδ), o ∈ O(Aδ), κ ≤ q, w ≤ o} (3σo ≤ o)
=
∧{κBpio | κ ∈ K(Qδ), o ∈ O(Aδ), κ ≤ q,3σw ≤ o} (by adjunction)
= qBpi3σw (by definition)
a
As an immediate consequence of Proposition 2.3 and Lemma 2.5 we get the following
Corollary 2.6. The logic LRC is strongly complete w.r.t. the class of perfect heterogeneous
LRC-algebras.
2.4. Disjunction property. In the present section, we show that the disjunction prop-
erty holds for LRC, by adapting the standard argument to the setting of heterogeneous
LRC-algebras. For any heterogeneous LRC-algebra F = (A,Q, B ,3, B,3 ), we let F ∗ :=
(A∗,Q, B ∗,3∗, B∗,3 ∗), where:
1. A∗ is the Heyting algebra obtained by adding a new top element >∗ to A (we let >A
denote the top element of A). Joins and meets in A∗ are defined as expected. The
implication →∗ of A∗ maps any (u,w) ∈ A∗ ×A∗ to >∗ if u ≤ w, to w if u = >∗, and to
u→ w in any other case.
2. B∗ : Q× A∗ → A∗ maps any (α, u) to >∗ if α = 0 or 3 ∗1 ≤ u, and to αBu otherwise.
3. 3∗ : A∗ → A∗ maps any u to 3u if u 6= >∗, and to 3>A if u = >∗.
4. B∗ : Q×Q→ A∗ maps any (α, β) to >∗ if α = 0 or β = 1, and to αBβ otherwise.
5. 3 ∗ : Q→ A∗ maps any α to 3α.
Lemma 2.7. F ∗ is a heterogeneous LRC-algebra.
Proof. It can be easily verified that the maps B ∗,3∗, B∗,3 ∗ satisfy by definition all the
monotonicity (resp. antitonicity) properties that yield the validity of the rules of LRC. Let us
verify that F ∗ validates all the axioms of LRC. By construction, >∗ is join-irreducible, i.e. if
u ∨ w = >∗ then either u = >∗ or w = >∗. Hence, 3∗(u ∨ w) = 3∗>∗ = 3>A = 3∗u ∨3∗w.
All the remaining cases follow from the assumptions on 3. This finishes the verification of the
validity of D1. The validity of axioms D2, D3 and D4 immediately follows from their validity
in F . The validity of axiom B1 can be shown using the identities α unionsq 0 = α and 0 unionsq β = β.
The validity of B2 follows immediately from the definition of B∗. As to B3, if α = 0 or
β = 0, the assumption that · preserves finite joins in each coordinate yields α · β = 0, and
hence α · βB∗A = >∗, which implies that the inequality holds. The remaining cases follow
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from the definition of B∗ and the assumption that B3 is valid in F . Axiom B4 is argued
similarly to B1. The validity of axioms B5 and B7 follows immediately from the definition
of B, and the validity of B6 can be shown using the identities α u 1 = α = 1 u α.
As to BD2, if α = 0 or β = 1 then αB∗3 ∗β = >∗, therefore the inequality holds. All the
remaining cases follow from the assumption that BD2 is valid in F .
As to BD1, if α = 0 then 3 ∗α ∧ αB∗u = ⊥ for any u, therefore the inequality holds. If
3 ∗1 ≤ u then, by definition, αB∗u = >∗, hence it is enough to show that 3 ∗α ≤ 3∗u. We
proceed by cases: (a) if u = >∗, then 3 ∗α = 3α ≤ >A = 3∗u, as required; (b) if u ∈ A,
then, by the assumption that B7, BD2 and MB hold in F ,
>A ≤ αB1 ≤ αB31 ≤ αBu.
Since BD1 holds in F , this implies that 3 ∗α = 3α ≤ 3u = 3∗u, as required. All the
remaining cases follow from the assumption that BD1 is valid in F . a
For every algebraic LRC-model M = (F, vFm, vRes), we let M∗ := (F ∗, v∗Fm, vRes), where v∗Fm
is defined by composing vFm with the natural injection A ↪→ A∗. Henceforth, we let [[a]] denote
the interpretation of any T-term a in M and [[a]]∗ the interpretation of a in M∗.
Lemma 2.8. For every formula A,
1. If [[A]]∗ 6= >∗ then [[A]]∗ = [[A]].
2. If [[A]]∗ = >∗ then [[A]] = >A.
Proof. We prove the two statements simultaneously by induction on A. The cases of
constants and atomic variables are straightforward. The case of A = B∧C immediately follows
from the induction hypothesis. The case of A = B∨C immediately follows from the induction
hypothesis using the join-irreducibility of >∗. If A = B → C, then [[A]]∗ = [[B]]∗ →∗ [[C]]∗. By
definition of→∗, if [[A]]∗ 6= >∗ then either (a) [[B]]∗ 6≤ [[C]]∗ and [[B]]∗ 6= >∗, which implies that
[[B]]∗ 6= >∗ 6= [[C]]∗ in which case item 1 follows by induction hypothesis; or (b) [[B]]∗ 6≤ [[C]]∗
and [[C]]∗ 6= >∗, which implies that [[C]]∗ = [[C]] by induction hypothesis. Then either (b1)
[[B]]∗ = >∗, hence by induction hypothesis [[B]] = >A and [[A]]∗ = [[C]]∗ = [[C]] = [[A]], as
required; or (b2) [[B]]∗ 6= >∗, hence by induction hypothesis [[B]]∗ = [[B]] and we finish the
proof as in case (a). If [[A]]∗ = >∗, then either (c) [[B]]∗ = >∗ = [[C]]∗, which implies by
induction hypothesis that [[B]] = >A = [[C]], which yields [[A]] = >A, as required; or (d)
[[B]]∗ ≤ [[C]]∗, which implies [[B]] ≤ [[C]] and hence [[A]] = >A, as required.
If A = 3B, then [[A]]∗ = 3
∗[[B]]∗. The definition of 3
∗ implies that [[A]]∗ 6= >∗, hence
to finish the proof of this case we need to show that [[A]]∗ = [[A]]. If [[B]]∗ 6= >∗, then by
induction hypothesis [[B]]∗ = [[B]], hence [[A]]∗ = 3
∗[[B]]∗ = 3[[B]] = [[3B]] = [[A]], as required.
If [[B]]∗ = >∗, then by induction hypothesis [[B]] = >A, hence [[A]]∗ = 3∗[[B]]∗ = 3∗>∗ =
3>A = 3[[B]] = [[3B]] = [[A]], as required.
If A = 3α, item 2 is again vacuously true, and item 1 immediately follows from the
definition of 3 ∗.
If A = αBβ, then [[A]]∗ = [[α]]∗B∗[[β]]∗ = [[α]]B∗[[β]]. Then by definition of B∗, if [[A]]∗ 6= >∗,
then [[A]]∗ = [[A]], as required, and if [[A]]∗ = >∗, then either [[α]] = 0 or [[β]] = 1; since axioms
B5 and B7 hold in F , each case yields [[A]] = >A, as required.
Finally, if A = αBB, then [[A]]∗ = [[α]]∗B∗[[B]]∗ = [[α]]B∗[[B]]∗. By definition of B∗, if
[[A]]∗ 6= >∗, then [[α]] 6= 0, [[A]]∗ = [[α]]B [[B]]∗, and 3 ∗1 6≤ [[B]]∗. The latter condition implies
that [[B]]∗ 6= >∗, hence, by induction hypothesis, [[B]]∗ = [[B]], and so [[A]]∗ = [[α]]B [[B]] = [[A]],
as required. If [[A]]∗ = >∗, then either (a) [[α]] = 0, which implies by B2 that [[A]] = [[α]]B [[B]] =
>A, as required; or (b) 3 ∗1 ≤ [[B]]∗, which implies by induction hypothesis that 3 ∗1 ≤ [[B]].
Hence, by BD2 and monotonicity of B ,
>A ≤ [[α]]B1 ≤ [[α]]B31 ≤ [[α]]B [[B]],
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which finishes the proof that [[A]] = [[αBB]] = >A, as required. a
The product F1×F2 of the heterogeneous LRC-algebras F1 and F2 is defined in the expected
way, based on the product algebras A1×A2 and Q1×Q2, and defining all (i.e. both internal and
external) operations component-wise. It can be readily verified that the resulting construction
is a heterogeneous LRC-algebra. The product construction can be extended to algebraic LRC-
models in the expected way, i.e. by pairing the valuations. Such valuations extend as usual
to T-terms, and it can be proved by a straightforward induction that [[a]]× = ([[a]]1, [[a]]2).
Proposition 2.9. The disjunction property holds for the logic LRC.
Proof. If B and C are not LRC-theorems, by completeness, algebraic LRC-modelsM1 and
M2 exist such that [[B]]1 6= >1 and [[C]]2 6= >2. Consider the product model M := M1 ×M2
as described above. Notice that [[B]] 6= (>1,>2) and likewise for C. The model M∗ does not
satisfy B ∨ C. Indeed, since >∗ is join-irreducible, if [[B ∨ C]]∗ = >∗ then either [[B]]∗ = >∗
or [[C]]∗ = >∗. By Lemma 2.8 this implies that either [[B]] = (>1,>2) or [[C]] = (>1,>2),
contradicting the assumptions. a
§3. The calculus D.LRC. In the present section, we introduce the multi-type calculus
D.LRC for the logic of resources and capabilities. As is typical of similar existing calculi,
the language manipulated by this calculus is built up from structural and operational term
constructors. In the tables below, each structural symbol in the upper rows corresponds to
one or two logical (aka operational) symbols in the lower rows. The idea, which will be made
precise in Section 4.1, is that each structural connective is interpreted as the corresponding
logical connective on the left-hand (resp. right-hand) side (if it exists) when occurring in
antecedent (resp. consequent) position.
As discussed in the previous section, the mathematical environment of heterogeneous LRC-
algebras provides natural interpretations for all connectives of the basic language of LRC. In
particular, on perfect heterogeneous LRC-algebras, these interpretations have the following
extra properties: the interpretations of 3 and 3 are completely join-preserving, that of B is
completely join-reversing in its first coordinate and order preserving in its second coordinate,
and B is completely join-reversing in its first coordinate and completely meet-preserving in
its second coordinate. This implies that, in each perfect heterogeneous LRC-algebra,
• 3 and 3 have right adjoints, denoted  and  respectively;
• B has a Galois-adjoint I in its first coordinate, and B has a Galois-adjoint I in its first
coordinate and a left adjoint N in its second coordinate.
Hence, the following connectives have a natural interpretation on perfect heterogeneous LRC-
algebras:
 : Fm→ Fm(3.1)
 : Fm→ Res(3.2)
I : Fm× Fm→ Res(3.3)
I : Fm× Res→ Res(3.4)
N : Res× Fm→ Res.(3.5)
• Structural and operational symbols for pure Fm-connectives:
Structural symbols I ; > (<)
Operational symbols > ⊥ ∧ ∨ (> ) → ( >) (←)
• Structural and operational symbols for pure Res-connectives:
Structural symbols Φ  , m l A (@)
Operational symbols 1 0 · u unionsq (·\) (/·) (unionsq\) (u\) (/unionsq) (/u)
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• Structural and operational symbols for the modal operators:
Structural symbols ◦ ·B · ◦ ·B ·
Operational symbols 3 B 3 B
• Structural and operational symbols for the adjoints and residuals of the modal operators:
Structural symbols • ·I · • ·N· ·I·
Operational symbols () (I) () (N) (I)
The display-type calculus D.LRC consists of the following display postulates, structural
rules, and operational rules:
1. Identity and cut rules:
p ` p a ` a
(X ` Y )[A]succ A ` Z
(X ` Y )[Z/A]succ
Γ ` α α ` ∆
Γ ` ∆
2. Display postulates for pure Fm-connectives:
X ;Y ` Z
Y ` X > Z
Z ` X ;Y
X > Z ` Y
X ;Y ` Z
X ` Z < Y
Z ` X ;Y
Z < Y ` X
3. Display postulates for pure Res-connectives:
Γ , ∆ ` Σ
∆ ` Γ A Σ
Γ , ∆ ` Σ
Γ ` Σ @ ∆
Γ ` ∆ , Σ
∆ A Γ ` Σ
Γ ` ∆ , Σ
Γ @ Σ ` ∆
Γ∆ ` Σ
∆ ` Γm Σ
Γ∆ ` Σ
Γ ` Σl∆
4. Display postulates for the modal operators:
◦X ` Y
X ` •Y
◦Γ ` X
Γ ` •X
X ` Γ ·B ·Y
Γ ` X ·I ·Y
X ` Γ·B ·∆
Γ ·N·X ` ∆
X ` Γ·B ·∆
Γ ` X ·I·∆
5. Pure Fm-type structural rules:
X ` Y
IL
I ;X ` Y
Y ` X
IR
Y ` X ; I
Y ;X ` Z
EL
X ;Y ` Z
Z ` X ;Y
ER
Z ` Y ;X
Y ` Z
WL
X ;Y ` Z
Z ` Y
WR
Z ` Y ;X
X ;X ` Y
CL
X ` Y
Y ` X ;X
CR
Y ` X
X ; (Y ;Z) ` W
AL
(X ;Y ) ;Z ` W
W ` (Z ;Y ) ;X
AR
W ` Z ; (Y ;X)
6. Pure Res-type structural rules:
Γ Φ ` ∆
ΦL1
Γ ` ∆
ΦL2
Φ Γ ` ∆
Γ ` ∆
ΦR
Γ ` ∆ , Φ
Γ (∆ Σ) ` Π
AL
(Γ∆) Σ ` Π
Φ ` ∆
WΦ
Γ ` ∆
Γ ` ∆
WL
Γ , Σ ` ∆
Γ ` ∆
WR
Γ ` ∆ , Σ
Γ , Γ ` ∆
CL
Γ ` ∆
Γ ` ∆ , ∆
CR
Γ ` ∆
Γ , ∆ ` Σ
EL
∆ , Γ ` Σ
Σ ` Γ , ∆
ER
Σ ` ∆ , Γ
Σ , (∆ , Γ) ` Π
AL
(Σ , ∆) , Γ ` Π
Π ` Σ , (∆ , Γ)
AR
Π ` (Σ , ∆) , Γ
Π ` (Γm∆) , (Γm Σ)
dis
Π ` Γm (∆ , Σ)
7. Structural rules corresponding to the D-axioms:
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X ` •Y ; •Z
D1
X ` •(Y ;Z)
Γ ` •X , •Y
D3
Γ ` •(X ;Y )
X ` I
D2
X ` •I
Γ ` Φ
D4
Γ ` •I
8. Structural rules corresponding to the B-axioms:
Γ ` (Y ·I·∆) , (Z ·I·∆)
B4
Γ ` (Y ;Z) ·I·∆
Γ ` (Y ·I ·W ) , (Z ·I ·W )
B1
Γ ` (Y ;Z) ·I ·W
(Γ ·N·X) , (Γ ·N·Y ) ` ∆
B6
Γ ·N· (X ;Y ) ` ∆
X ` Γ ·B · (∆ ·B ·Y )
B3
X ` Γ∆ ·B ·Y
Φ ` ∆
B7
Γ ·N· I ` ∆
9. Structural rules corresponding to the BD-axioms:
X ` Γ ·B · •Y
BD1
X ` ◦Γ > Y
X ` Γ·B · •Y
BD2
X ` Γ ·B ·Y
10. Introduction rules for pure Fm-connectives (in the presence of the exchange rules EL and
ER, the structural connective < and the corresponding operational connectives
>and
← are redundant and they are omitted):
⊥L ⊥ ` I
X ` I ⊥R
X ` ⊥
I ` X>L > ` X >RI ` >
A ;B ` X∧L
A ∧B ` X
X ` A Y ` B ∧R
X ;Y ` A ∧B
A ` X B ` Y∨L
A ∨B ` X ;Y
X ` A ;B ∨R
X ` A ∨B
X ` A B ` Y→L
A→ B ` X > Y
X ` A > B →R
X ` A→ B
11. Introduction rules for pure Res-connectives:
0L
0 ` Φ
Γ ` Φ
0R
Γ ` 0
Φ ` Γ
1L
1 ` Γ 1RΦ ` 1
α β ` Γ·L
α · β ` Γ
Γ ` α ∆ ` β ·R
Γ∆ ` α · β
α ` Γ β ` ∆unionsqL
α unionsq β ` Γ , ∆
Γ ` α , β unionsqR
Γ ` α unionsq β
12. Introduction rules for the modal operators:
◦A ` X3L
3A ` X
X ` A 3R◦X ` 3A
Γ ` α A ` X B L
αBA ` Γ ·B ·X
X ` α ·B ·A BR
X ` αBA
◦α ` X
3L
3α ` X
Γ ` α
3R◦Γ ` 3α
Γ ` α β ` ∆ BL
αBα ` Γ·B ·∆
Γ ` α·B ·α BR
Γ ` αBα
We conclude the present section by listing some observations about D.LRC. Firstly, notice
that, although very similar in spirit to a display calculus [3, 72], D.LRC does not enjoy the
display property, the reason being that a display rule for displaying substructures in the scope
of the second coordinate of ·B · occurring in consequent position would not be sound. This is
the reason why a more general form of cut rule, sometimes referred to as surgical cut, has been
included than the standard one in display calculi where both cut formulas occur in display.
However, as discussed in [33], calculi without display property can still verify the assumptions
of some Belnap-style cut elimination metatheorem. In Section 4.3, we will verify that this is
the case of D.LRC. Secondly, as usual, the version of D.LRC on a classical propositional base
can be obtained by adding e.g. the following Grishin rules:
X > (Y ;Z) ` W
(X > Y ) ;Z ` W
X ` Y > (Z ;W )
X ` (Y > Z) ;W
Thirdly, the rule WΦ encodes (and is used to derive) α · β ` α, α · β ` β, α ` 1, B2 and B5.
§4. Basic properties of D.LRC. In the present section, we verify that the calculus
D.LRC is sound w.r.t. the semantics of perfect heterogeneous LRC-algebras (cf. Definition 2.1),
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is syntactically complete w.r.t. the Hilbert calculus for LRC introduced in Section 2.1, enjoys
cut-elimination and subformula property, and conservatively extends the Hilbert calculus of
Section 2.1.
4.1. Soundness. In the present subsection, we outline the verification of the soundness of
the rules of D.LRC w.r.t. the semantics of perfect heterogeneous LRC-algebras (cf. Definition
2.1). The first step consists in interpreting structural symbols as logical symbols according to
their (precedent or consequent) position,11 as indicated in the synoptic tables at the beginning
of Section 3. This makes it possible to interpret sequents as inequalities, and rules as quasi-
inequalities. For example, the rules on the left-hand side below are interpreted as the quasi-
inequalities on the right-hand side:
X ` Γ ·B · •Y
BD1
X ` ◦Γ > Y  ∀γ∀x∀y[x ≤ γB y ⇒ x ≤ 3γ → y]
X ` Γ·B · •Y
BD2
X ` Γ ·B ·Y  ∀x∀γ∀y[x ≤ γBy ⇒ x ≤ γB y].
The verification that the rules of D.LRC are sound on perfect LRC-algebras then consists in
verifying the validity of their corresponding quasi-inequalities in perfect LRC-algebras. The
validity of these quasi-inequalities follows straightforwardly from two observations. The first
observation is that the quasi-inequality corresponding to each rule is obtained by running the
algorithm ALBA on the axiom of the Hilbert-style presentation of Section 2.1 bearing the
same name as the rule. Below we perform the ALBA reduction on the axiom BD1:
∀α∀p[3α ∧ αB p ≤ 3p]
iff ∀α∀p∀γ∀x∀y[(γ ≤ α & x ≤ αB p & 3p ≤ y)⇒ 3γ ∧ x ≤ y]
iff ∀α∀p∀γ∀x∀y[(γ ≤ α & x ≤ αB p & p ≤  y)⇒ 3γ ∧ x ≤ y]
iff ∀γ∀x∀y[x ≤ γB y ⇒ 3γ ∧ x ≤ y]
iff ∀γ∀x∀y[x ≤ γB y ⇒ x ≤ 3γ → y].
It can be readily checked that the ALBA manipulation rules applied in the computation
above (adjunction rules and Ackermann rules) are sound on perfect LRC-algebras. As dis-
cussed in [44], the soundness of these rules only depends on the order-theoretic properties of
the interpretation of the logical connectives and their adjoints and residuals. The fact that
some of these maps are not internal operations but have different domains and codomains does
not make any substantial difference. A more substantial difference with the setting of [44]
might be in principle the fact that the connective B is only monotone—rather than normal—
in its second coordinate. However, notice that each manipulation in the chain of equivalences
above involving that coordinate is an application of the Ackermann rule of ALBA, which relies
on no more than monotonicity. The second observation is that the axioms of the Hilbert-style
presentation of Section 2.1 are valid by definition on perfect LRC-algebras. We conclude the
present subsection reporting the ALBA-reduction of (the condition expressing the validity of)
axiom BD2.
∀α∀β[αBβ ≤ αB3β]
iff ∀α∀β∀x∀γ∀y[(x ≤ αBβ & γ ≤ α & 3β ≤ y)⇒ x ≤ γB y]
iff ∀α∀β∀x∀γ∀y[(x ≤ αBβ & γ ≤ α & β ≤ y)⇒ x ≤ γB y]
iff ∀x∀γ∀y[x ≤ γBy ⇒ x ≤ γB y].
11For any (formula or resource) sequent x ` y in the language of D.LRC, we define the signed generation trees
+x and −y by labelling the root of the generation tree of x (resp. y) with the sign + (resp. −), and then
propagating the sign to all nodes according to the polarity of the coordinate of the connective assigned to each
node. Positive (resp. negative) coordinates propagate the same (resp. opposite) sign to the corresponding child
node. The only negative coordinates are the first coordinates of >, ·B · and ·B ·. Then, a substructure z in
x ` y is in precedent (resp. consequent) position if the sign of its root node as a subtree of +x or −y is + (resp.
−).
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4.2. Completeness. In the present subsection, we show that the axioms of the Hilbert-
style calculus H.LRC introduced in Section 2.1 are derivable sequents of D.LRC, and that the
rules of H.LRC are derivable rules of D.LRC. Since H.LRC is complete w.r.t. the semantics of
perfect heterogeneous LRC-algebras (cf. Definition 2.1), we obtain as a corollary that D.LRC
is also complete w.r.t. the semantics of perfect heterogeneous LRC-algebras. The derivations
of the axioms R1-R3 of H.LRC are standard and we omit them.
R4. α · (β unionsq γ)↔ (α · β) unionsq (α · γ)
α ` α β ` β
α β ` α · β
β ` αm α · β
α ` α γ ` γ
α γ ` α · γ
γ ` αm α · γ
β unionsq γ ` (αm α · β) , (αm α · γ)
dis
β unionsq γ ` αm (α · β , α · γ)
α (β unionsq γ) ` α · β , α · γ
α · (β unionsq γ) ` α · β , α · γ
α · (β unionsq γ) ` (α · β) unionsq (α · γ)
α ` α
β ` β
β ` β , γ
β ` β unionsq γ
α β ` α · (β unionsq γ)
α · β ` α · (β unionsq γ)
α ` α
γ ` γ
γ ` β , γ
γ ` β unionsq γ
α γ ` α · (β unionsq γ)
α · γ ` α · (β unionsq γ)
(α · β) unionsq (α · γ) ` α · (β unionsq γ) , α · (β unionsq γ)
(α · β) unionsq (α · γ) ` α · (β unionsq γ)
The proof of (β unionsq γ) · α↔ (β · α) unionsq (γ · α) is analogous and we omit it.
D1. 3(A ∨B)↔ 3A ∨3B
A ` A
◦A ` 3A
A ` •3A
B ` B
◦B ` 3B
B ` •3B
A ∨B ` •3A ; •3B
D1
A ∨B ` •(3A ;3B)
◦A ∨B ` 3A ;3B
3(A ∨B) ` 3A ;3B
3(A ∨B) ` 3A ∨3B
A ` A
A ` A ;B
A ` A ∨B
◦A ` 3(A ∨B)
3A ` 3(A ∨B)
B ` B
B ` A ;B
B ` A ∨B
◦B ` 3(A ∨B)
3B ` 3(A ∨B)
3A ∨3B ` 3(A ∨B) ;3(A ∨B)
3A ∨3B ` 3(A ∨B)
D3. 3 (α unionsq β)↔ 3α ∨3β
α ` α
◦α ` 3α
α ` •3α
β ` β
◦β ` 3β
β ` •3β
α unionsq β ` •3α , •3β
D3
α unionsq β ` •(3α ;3β)
◦α unionsq β ` 3α ;3β
3 (α unionsq β) ` 3α ;3β
3 (α unionsq β) ` 3α ∨3β
α ` α
α ` α , β
α ` α unionsq β
◦α ` 3 (α unionsq β)
3α ` 3 (α unionsq β)
β ` β
β ` α , β
β ` α unionsq β
◦β ` 3 (α unionsq β)
3β ` 3 (α unionsq β)
3α unionsq3β ` 3 (α unionsq β) , 3 (α unionsq β)
3α unionsq3β ` 3 (α unionsq β)
D2. 3⊥ ↔ ⊥
⊥ ` I
D2⊥ ` •I
◦⊥ ` I
◦⊥ ` ⊥
3⊥ ` ⊥
⊥ ` I
⊥ ` 3⊥ ; I
⊥ ` 3⊥
D4. 30↔ ⊥
0 ` Φ
D4
0 ` •I
◦0 ` I
◦0 ` ⊥
30 ` ⊥
0 ` Φ
0 ` 30 , Φ
0 ` 30
B1. α unionsq βBA↔ (αBA) ∧ (βBA)
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α ` α
α ` α , β
α ` α unionsq β A ` A
α unionsq βBA ` α ·B ·A
α unionsq βBA ` αBA
β ` β
β ` α , β
β ` α unionsq β A ` A
α unionsq βBA ` β ·B ·A
α unionsq βBA ` βBA
α unionsq βBA ;α unionsq βBA ` (αBA) ∧ (βBA)
α unionsq βBA ` (αBA) ∧ (βBA)
α ` α A ` A
αBA ` α ·B ·A
α ` αBA ·I ·A
β ` β A ` A
βBA ` β ·B ·A
β ` βBA ·I ·A
α unionsq β ` (αBA ·I ·A) , (βBA ·I ·A)
B1
α unionsq β ` (αBA ;βBA) ·I ·A
αBA ;βBA ` α unionsq β ·B ·A
αBA ;βBA ` α unionsq βBA
(αBA) ∧ (βBA) ` α unionsq βBA
B4. α unionsq βBγ ↔ (αBγ) ∧ (βBγ)
α ` α
α ` α , β
α ` α unionsq β γ ` γ
α unionsq βBγ ` α·B ·γ
α unionsq βBγ ` αBγ
β ` β
β ` α , β
β ` α unionsq β γ ` γ
α unionsq βBγ ` β·B ·γ
α unionsq βBγ ` βBγ
α unionsq βBγ ;α unionsq βBγ ` (αBγ) ∧ (βBγ)
α unionsq βBγ ` (αBγ) ∧ (βBγ)
α ` α γ ` γ
αBγ ` α·B ·γ
α ` αBγ ·I· γ
β ` β γ ` γ
βBγ ` β·B ·γ
β ` βBγ ·I· γ
α unionsq β ` (αBγ ·I· γ) , (βBγ ·I· γ)
B4
α unionsq β ` (αBγ ;βBγ) ·I· γ
αBγ ;βBγ ` α unionsq β·B ·γ
αBγ ;βBγ ` α unionsq βBγ
(αBγ) ∧ (βBγ) ` α unionsq βBγ
B2. 0BA
0 ` Φ
0 ` I ·I ·A , Φ
0 ` I ·I ·A
I ` 0 ·B ·A
I ` 0BA
B5. 0Bα
0 ` Φ
0 ` I ·I·α , Φ
0 ` I ·I·α
I ` 0·B ·α
I ` 0Bα
B3. αB (βBA)→ (α · βBA)
α ` α
β ` β A ` A
βBA ` β ·B ·A
αB (βBA) ` α ·B · (β ·B ·A)
B3
αB (βBA) ` (α β) ·B ·A
α β ` (αB (βBA)) ·I ·A
α · β ` (αB (βBA)) ·I ·A
αB (βBA) ` (α · β) ·B ·A
αB (βBA) ` (α · β)BA
B6. αB(β u γ)↔ αBβ ∧ αBγ
α ` α
β ` β
β , γ ` β
β u γ ` β
αBβ u γ ` α·B ·β
αBβ u γ ` αBβ
α ` α
γ ` γ
γ , β ` γ
β , γ ` γ
β u γ ` γ
αBβ u γ ` α·B ·γ
αBβ u γ ` αBγ
αBβ u γ ;αBβ u γ ` (αBβ) ∧ (αBγ)
αBβ u γ ` (αBβ) ∧ (αBγ)
α ` α β ` β
αBβ ` α·B ·β
α ·N·αBβ ` β
α ` α γ ` γ
αBγ ` α·B ·γ
α ·N·αBγ ` γ
(α ·N·αBβ) , (α ·N·αBγ) ` β u γ
B6
α ·N· (αBβ ;αBγ) ` β u γ
αBβ ;αBγ ` α·B ·β u γ
αBβ ;αBγ ` αBβ u γ
(αBβ) ∧ (αBγ) ` αBβ u γ
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B7. αB1
Φ ` 1
α ·N· I , Φ ` 1
α ·N· I ` 1
I ` α·B ·1
I ` αB1
BD1. 3α ∧ αBA→ 3A
α ` α
A ` A
◦A ` 3A
A ` •3A
αBA ` α ·B · •3A
BD1
αBA ` ◦α > 3A
◦α ;αBA ` 3A
◦α ` 3A < αBA
3α ` 3A < αBA
3α ;αBA ` 3A
3α ∧ αBA ` 3A
BD2. αBβ → αB3β
α ` α
β ` β
◦β ` 3β
β ` •3β
αBβ ` α·B · •3β
BD2
αBβ ` α ·B ·3β
αBβ ` αB3β
The rules of H.LRC immediately follow from applications of the introduction rules of the
corresponding logical connectives in the usual way and we omit their derivations.
4.3. Cut-elimination and subformula property. In the present subsection, we sketch
the verification that the D.LRC is a proper multi-type calculus (cf. Section A). By Theorem
A.3, this is enough to establish that the calculus enjoys cut elimination and subformula
property. With the exception of C′8, all conditions are straightforwardly verified by inspecting
the rules, and this verification is left to the reader.
As to the verification of condition C′8, the only interesting case is the one in which the cut
formula is of the form αBA, since the connective B is monotone rather than normal in its
second coordinate, which is the reason why not even a weak form of display property holds
for D.LRC. This case is treated below. Notice that, since all principal formulas are in display,
no surgical cuts need to be eliminated in the principal stage.
... pi1
X ` α ·B ·A
X ` αBA
... pi2
Γ ` α
... pi3
A ` Y
αBA ` Γ ·B ·Y
X ` Γ ·B ·Y  
... pi2
Γ ` α
... pi1
X ` α ·B ·A
α ` X ·B ·A
Γ ` X ·B ·A
X ` Γ ·B ·A
... pi3
A ` Y
X ` Γ ·B ·Y
4.4. Semantic conservativity. To argue that the calculus D.LRC adequately captures
LRC, we follow the standard proof strategy discussed in [44]. Recall that `LRC denotes
the syntactic consequence relation arising from the Hilbert system for LRC introduced in
Section 2.1. We need to show that, for all LRC-formulas A and B, if A ` B is a provable
sequent in the calculus D.LRC, then A `LRC B. This fact can be verified using the following
standard argument and facts: (a) the rules of D.LRC are sound w.r.t. perfect heterogeneous
LRC-algebras (cf. Section 4.1), and (b) LRC is strongly complete w.r.t. perfect heterogeneous
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LRC-algebras (cf. Corollary 2.6). Then, let A,B be LRC-formulas such that A ` B is a
derivable sequent in D.LRC. By (a), this implies that A |=LRC B, which implies, by (b), that
A `LRC B, as required.
§5. Case studies. In this section, we present a number of case studies, with the purpose
of highlighting various aspects of the basic framework and also various ways in which it can
be adapted to different settings. The most common adaptations performed in the case studies
below consist in adding analytic structural rules to the basic calculus. Interestingly, the
resulting calculi still enjoy the same package of basic properties (soundness, completeness,
cut-elimination, subformula property, conservativity) which hold of D.LRC as an immediate
consequence of general results. Indeed, it can be readily verified that the axioms corresponding
to each of the rules introduced below are analytic inductive (cf. [44, Definition 55]), and
hence are canonical (cf. [44, Theorem 19]). Therefore, the axiomatic extensions of LRC
corresponding to these axioms is sound and complete w.r.t. the corresponding subclass of
LRC-models. Conservativity can be argued by repeating verbatim the same argument given
in Section 4.4 which uses the soundness of the augmented calculus w.r.t. the corresponding
class of perfect LRC-models, and the completeness of the Hilbert-style presentation of the
axiomatic extension which holds because the additional axioms are canonical. Finally, cut-
elimination and subformula property follow from the general cut-elimination metatheorem.
In what follows, we will sometimes abuse terminology and speak of a formula A being
derived from certain assumptions A1; . . . ;An meaning that the sequent A1; . . . ;An ` A is
derivable in the calculus.
5.1. Pooling capabilities (correcting a homework assignment). Two teaching as-
sistants, Carl (c) and Dan (d), are assigned the task of grading a set of homework assignments
consisting of two exercises, a model-theoretic one (M) and a proof-theoretic one (P ). Carl
is only capable of correcting exercise P , while Dan is only capable of correcting exercise M .
None of the two teaching assistants can individually complete the task they have been as-
signed. However, they can if they pool their capabilities. One way in which they can complete
the task is by implementing the following plan: they split the set of homework assignments
into two sets α and β. Initially, Carl grades the solutions to exercise P in α and Dan those
of M in β. Then they switch sets and each of them grades the solutions to the same exercise
in the other set.
To capture this case study in (a multi-agent version of) D.LRC, we introduce atomic propo-
sitions such as Pα (resp. Mβ), the intended meaning of which is that all solutions to exercise
P (resp. M) in α (resp. β) have been graded. We also treat α and β as resources. The
following table contains formulas expressing the assumptions about agents’ capabilities, the
initial state of affairs (which resources are initially in possession of which agent), and the plan
of switching after completing the correction of one exercise in a given set:
Capabilities initial state planning
αBcPα βBcPβ 3cα Mβ → 3cβ
αBdMα βBdMβ 3dβ Pα → 3dα
In the present setting we also assume that, whenever an agent is able to bring about a
certain state of affairs, the agent will. Formally, this corresponds to the validity of the axioms
3iA→ A for every agent i and formula A. This axiom does not follow from the logic H.LRC,
and in many settings it would not be sound. However, for the sake of the present case study,
we will assume that this axiom holds. In fact, this axiom corresponds to the following rules
‘Exi’ (‘Ex’ stands for Execution), for each i∈ {c, d}:
X ` YExi ◦iX ` Y
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Notice that these rules are analytic (cf. Section A). Hence, by Theorem A.3, when adding
these rules to the basic calculus D.LRC, the resulting calculus (which we refer to as D.LRC
+ Ex) enjoys cut elimination and subformula property.
We aim at deriving the formula (Pα ∧Mβ)∧ (Pβ ∧Mα) from the assumptions above in the
calculus D.LRC + Ex. This will provide the formal verification that executing the plan yields
the completion of the task. Let us start by considering the following derivations:
pi1 pi2
...
proof for
BD1
3cα ;αBcPα ` 3cPα
Pα ` Pα
Ex ◦cPα ` Pα
3cPα ` Pα
Cut
3cα ;αBcPα ` Pα
...
proof for
BD1
3dβ ;αBdMβ ` 3dMβ
Mβ ` Mβ
Ex ◦dMβ ` Mβ
3dMβ ` Mβ
Cut
3dβ ;βBdMβ ` Mβ
pi3 pi4
...
proof for
BD1
3cβ ;βBcPβ ` 3cPβ
Pβ ` Pβ
Ex ◦cPβ ` Pβ
3cPβ ` Pβ
Cut
3cβ ;βBcPβ ` Pβ
...
proof for
BD1
3dα ;αBdMα ` 3dMα
Mα ` Mα
Ex ◦dMα ` Mα
3dMα ` Mα
Cut
3dα ;αBdMα ` Mα
These derivations follow one and the same pattern, and each derives one piece of the desired
conclusion. Hence, one would want to suitably prolong these derivations by applying ∧R to
reach the conclusion. However, while the conclusions of pi1 and pi2 contain only formulas which
are assumptions in our case study as reported in the table above, the formulas 3cβ and 3dα,
occurring in the conclusions of pi3 and pi4 respectively, are not assumptions. However, they
are provable from the assumptions. Indeed, they encode states of affairs which hold after c
and d have switched the sets α and β.
Notice that the following sequents are provable (their derivations are straightforward and
are omitted):
Mβ;Mβ → 3cβ ` 3cβ Pα;Pα → 3dα ` 3dα
These sequents say that the formulas 3cβ and 3dα are provable from the ‘planning assump-
tions’ (cf. table above) using the formulas Mβ and Pα which have been derived purely from
the assumptions by pi1 and pi2. Hence, the atoms Pβ and Mα can be derived from the original
assumptions via cut. Then, applying ∧R and possibly contraction, one can derive the desired
sequent.
5.2. Conjoining capabilities (the wisdom of the crow). A BBC documentary pro-
gram shows a problem-solving test conducted on a crow. In the present subsection we formalize
an adapted version of this test. There is food (φ) positioned deep in a narrow box, out of the
reach of the crow’s beak. There is a short stick (σ) directly available to the crow, two stones
(ρ1, ρ2) each inside a cage, and a long stick (λ) inside a transparent box which releases the
stick if enough weight (that of two stones or more) lays inside the box. The stick σ is too
short for the crow to reach the food using it. However, previous tests have shown that the
crow is capable of performing the following individual steps: (a) reaching the food using the
long stick; (b) retrieving the stones from the cages using the short stick; (c) retrieving the
long stick by dropping stones into a slot in the box. The crow succeeded in executing these
individual steps in the right order and got to the food.
An interesting feature of this case study is the interplay of different kinds of resources.
Specifically, σ is a reusable resource (indeed, the crow uses the same stick to reach the two
stones), which fact can be expressed by the sequent σ ` σ · σ. Also, the following formula
holds of all resources relevant to the present case study: αBγ ∧ βBδ → α · βBγ · δ. This
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formula implies a form of scalability of resources,12 which is not a property holding in general,
and hence has not been added to the general calculus. The crow passing the test shows
to be able to conjoin the separate capabilities together. This is expressed by the following
transitivity-type axiom: αBβ∧βBγ → αBγ. The crow’s achievement is remarkable precisely
because this axiom cannot be expected to hold of any agent. These conditions translate into
the following analytic rules:
Σ Σ ` Ω
Contr
Σ ` Ω
(Γ ·N·X) (Π ·N·Y ) ` ∆
Scalab
(ΓΠ) ·N· (X ;Y ) ` ∆
(Γ ·N·X) ·N·Y ` ∆
Trans
Γ ·N· (X ;Y ) ` ∆
In order for the rule Contr to satisfy C6 and C9, we need to work with a version of D.LRC
which admits two types of resources: the reusable ones (for which the contraction rule is
sound) and the general ones for which contraction is not sound. Hence, the contraction
would be introduced only for the reusable type. Once the new type has been introduced, the
language and calculus of LRC need to be expanded with copies of each original connective,
so as to account for the fact that each copy takes in input and outputs exactly one type
unambiguously. Correspondingly, copies of each original rule have to be added so that each
copy accounts for exactly one reading of the original rule. This is a tedious but entirely
safe procedure that guarantees that a proper multi-type calculus (cf. Definition A.2) can be
introduced which admits all the rules above. The reader is referred to [32, 34] for examples
of such a disambiguation procedure.
The following table shows the assumptions of the present case study:
Initial state Capabilities
σBρ
3σ ρ · ρBλ
λBϕ
We aim at proving the following sequent:
σBρ ; ρ · ρBλ ;λBφ ;3σ ` 33φ.
We do it in several steps: first, in the following derivation pi1, we prove that for any reusable
resource σ, if σBρ then σBρ · ρ:
σ ` σ ρ ` ρ
σBρ ` σ·B ·ρ
σ ·N·σBρ ` ρ
σ ` σ ρ ` ρ
σBρ ` σ·B ·ρ
σ ·N·σBρ ` ρ
(σ ·N·σBρ) (σ ·N·σBρ) ` ρ · ρ
Scalab
(σ  σ) ·N· (σBρ ;σBρ) ` ρ · ρ
σBρ ;σBρ ` σ  σ·B ·ρ · ρ
σ  σ ` (σBρ ;σBρ) ·I· ρ · ρ
Contr
σ ` (σBρ ;σBρ) ·I· ρ · ρ
σBρ ;σBρ ` σ·B ·ρ · ρ
σBρ ` σ·B ·ρ · ρ
σBρ ` σBρ · ρ
Second, in the following derivation pi2, we prove an instance of the transitivity axiom:
12That is, if the agent is capable of getting one (measure of) β from one (measure of) α, then is also capable
to get two or n (measures of) β from two or n (measures of) α.
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σ ` σ
ρ ` ρ ρ ` ρ
ρ ρ ` ρ · ρ
ρ · ρ ` ρ · ρ
σBρ · ρ ` σ·B ·ρ · ρ
σ ·N·σBρ · ρ ` ρ · ρ λ ` λ
ρ · ρBλ ` σ ·N·σBρ · ρ·B ·λ
(σ ·N·σBρ · ρ) ·N· ρ · ρBλ ` λ
Trans
σ ·N· (σBρ · ρ ; ρ · ρBλ) ` λ
σBρ · ρ ; ρ · ρBλ ` σ·B ·λ
σBρ · ρ ; ρ · ρBλ ` σBλ
Similarly, a derivation pi3 can be given of the following instance of the transitivity axiom:
σBλ ;λBφ ` σBφ.
Finally, the following derivation pi4 is the missing piece:
...
proof for
BD2
σBφ ` σB3φ
...
proof for
BD1
σB3φ ;3σ ` 33φ
σB3φ ` 33φ < 3σ
Cut
σBφ ` 33φ < 3σ
σBφ ;3σ ` 33φ
The requested sequent can be then derived using pi1-pi4 via cuts and display postulates.
5.3. Resources having different roles (The Gift of the Magi). The Gift of the Magi
is a short story, written by O. Henry and first appeared in 1905, about a young married couple
of very modest means, Jim (j) and Della (d), who have only two possessions between them
which are of value (both monetarily and in the sense that they take pride in them): Della’s
unusually long hair (η), and Jim’s family gold watch (ω). On Christmas Eve, Della sells her
hair to buy a chain (γ) for Jim’s watch, and Jim sells his watch to buy an ivory brush (β) for
Della.
Jim and Della are materially worse off at the end of the story than at the beginning, since,
while the resources ω and η could be used/enjoyed on their own, γ and β can only be used
when coupled with ω and η respectively. In fact, the very choice of γ and β as presents is a
direct consequence of the fact that—besides being used by their respective owners as a means
to get the money to buy a present for the other—the resources ω and η are used by the partner
of their respective owners as beacons guiding them in their choice of a present. For instance,
their final situation would not have been as bad if Della had bought Jim a new overcoat or a
pair of gloves, or if Jim had bought Della replacements for her old brown jacket or hat, the
need for which is indicated in the short story. However, each wants to make their present as
meaningful as possible to the other one, and hence each targets his/her present at the one
possession the other takes pride in.
Finally, the uniqueness of the meaningful resource of each agent is the reason why “the
whole affair has something of the dark inevitability of Greek tragedy” (cit. P. G. Wodehouse,
Thank you, Jeeves): indeed, ω (resp. η) is both the only target for a meaningful present for
Jim (resp. Della), and also the only means he (resp. she) has to acquire such a present for her
(resp. him).
To formalize the observations above, we will need a modification of the language of LRC
capturing the fact, which is sometimes relevant, that resources might have different roles e.g.
in the generation or the acquisition of a given resource. For instance, in the production of
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bread, the oven has a different role as a resource than water and flour; in shooting sports, the
shooter uses a shooting device, projectiles and a target in different roles, etc. Roles cannot be
reduced to how resources are combined irrespective of agency (this aspect is modelled by the
pure-resource connectives u and ·); rather, assigning roles to resources is a facet of agency.
Accordingly, we consider the following ternary connective for each agent:
[−,−]B− : Res× Res× Res→ Fm,
the intended meaning of which is ‘the agent is capable of obtaining the resource in the third
coordinate, whenever in possession of the resources in the first two coordinates in their re-
spective roles’. Algebraically (and axiomatically), this connective is finitely join-reversing in
the first two coordinates and finitely meet-preserving in the third one. Its introduction rules
and display postulates are as expected:
Γ ` α Θ ` β γ ` Σ
[α, β]Bγ ` [Γ,Θ]·B ·Σ
X ` [α, β]·B ·γ
X ` [α, β]Bγ
X ` [Γ,Θ]·B ·Σ
[Γ,Θ] ·N·X ` Σ
X ` [Γ,Θ]·B ·Σ
Γ ` [X,Θ] ·I·1 Σ
X ` [Γ,Θ]·B ·Σ
Θ ` [Γ, X] ·I·2 Σ
In addition, we need two unary diamond operators 3 1,3 2 : Res → Fm for each agent, the
intended meaning of which is ‘the agent is in possession of the resource (in the argument) in the
first (resp. second) role’. The basic algebraic and axiomatic behaviour of 3 1 and 3 2 coincides
with that of 3 , hence the introduction and display rules relative to these connectives are like
those given for 3 . The various roles and their differences can be understood and formalized
in different ways relative to different settings. In the specific situation of the short story, we
stipulate that 3 2 has the meaning usually attributed to 3 , and understand 3 1σ as ‘the agent
has resource σ available in the role of target (or beacon)’.
The interaction of these connectives, and the difference in meaning between 3 1 and 3 2,
are captured by the following axiom:
3 1σ ∧3 2ξ ∧ [σ, ξ]Bχ→ 33 2χ,(5.1)
which is equivalent on perfect LRC-algebras to the following analytic rule:
◦◦2 [Σ,Ξ] ·N·X ` Y
RR◦1Σ ; ◦2 Ξ ;X ` Y
Finally, in the specific case at hand, we will use the rules corresponding to the following
slightly modified multi-agent versions of axiom (5.1):
3 1j σ ∧3 2j ξ ∧ [σ, ξ]Bjχ→ 3j3 2dχ and 3 1d σ ∧3 2d ξ ∧ [σ, ξ]Bdχ→ 3d3 2jχ.
The following table shows the assumptions of the present case study:
Initial state Capabilities Abilities
Jim j 3 1j η 3
2
jω [η, ω]Bjβ 3j3 2d β → 3j¬3 2jω
Della d 3 1dω 3
2
d η [ω, η]Bdγ 3d3 2j γ → 3d¬3 2d η
Let H be the structural conjunction of the assumptions above. We aim at deriving the
following sequent in the calculus D.LRC to which the analytic rules introduced above have
been added:
H ` 3j¬3 2jω ∧3j3 2d β ∧3d¬3 2d η ∧3d3 2j γ.
We do it in several steps: first, the following derivation pi1:
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η ` η ω ` ω β ` β
[η, ω]Bjβ ` [η, ω]·B ·jβ
[η, ω] ·N·j[η, ω]Bjβ ` β
◦2d
(
[η, ω] ·N·j[η, ω]Bjβ
)
` 3 2d β
◦j◦2d
(
[η, ω] ·N·j[η, ω]Bjβ
)
` 3j3 2d β
RRjd
(◦1j η ; ◦2jω) ; [η, ω]Bjβ ` 3j3 2d β
(3 1j η ;3
2
jω) ; [η, ω]Bjβ ` 3j3 2d β
With an analogous derivation pi2 we can prove that
3 1dω ;3
2
d η ; [ω, η]Bdγ ` 3d3 2j γ.
Next, let pi3 be the following derivation:
β ` β
◦2d β ` 3 2d β
◦j3 2d β ` 3j3 2d β
3j3
2
d β ` 3j3 2d β
ω ` ω
◦2jω ` 3 2jω
3 2jω ` 3 2jω ⊥ ` ⊥
3 2jω → ⊥ ` 3 2jω > ⊥
3 2jω → ⊥ ` 3 2jω → ⊥
def¬3 2jω ` ¬3 2jω
◦j¬3 2jω ` 3j¬3 2jω
3j¬3 2jω ` 3j¬3 2jω
3j3
2
d β → 3j¬3 2jω ` 3j3 2d β > 3j¬3 2jω
3j3
2
d β ;3j3
2
d β → 3j¬3 2jω ` 3j¬3 2jω
With an analogous derivation pi4 we can prove that
3d3
2
j γ ;3d3
2
j γ → 3d¬3 2d η ` 3d¬3 2d η.
Then, by applying cut (and left weakening) on pi1 and pi3 one derives:
3 1j η ;3
2
jω ; [η, ω]Bjβ ;3j3 2d β → 3j¬3 2jω ` 3j¬3 2jω.
Likewise, by applying cut (and left weakening) on pi2 and pi4 one derives:
3 1dω ;3
2
d η ; [ω, η]Bdγ ;3d3 2j γ → 3d¬3 2d η ` 3d¬3 2d η.
The derivation is concluded with applications of right-introduction of ∧ and left contraction
rules.
5.4. From local to global resilience (two production lines). Resilience is the ability
of an agent or an organization to realize their goals notwithstanding unexpected changes
and disruptions. The language of LRC provides a natural way to understand resilience as
the capability to realize one’s goal(s) in a range of situations characterized by the reduced
availability of key resources. Consider for example a factory with two production lines for
products γ1 and γ2. Product γ1 is of higher quality than γ2 and can only be produced using
resource α, the availability of which is subject to fluctuations. Product γ2 can be produced
using either resource α or β, and the availability of β is not subject to fluctuations. It is
interesting to note that the ‘local’ resilience in the production of γ2 (namely, the fact that
any shortage in α can be dealt with by switching to β) results in the resilience of both
production lines. Indeed, when α is available for only one of the two production lines, all
of it can be employed in the production line for γ1, and the production of γ2 is switched to
β. In the formal treatment that follows, we notice that the axioms 3σ ∧ σBpi → 3pi and
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σBχ ∧ piBξ → σ · piBχ · ξ hold for the setting described above. These axioms are analytic
and are equivalent on perfect LRC-algebras to the following rules:
X ` Γ·B · •Y
BDR
X ` ◦Γ > Y
(Γ ·N·X) (Π ·N·Y ) ` ∆
Scalab
(ΓΠ) ·N· (X ;Y ) ` ∆
Resources Capabilities
3 (((α · α) unionsq α) · β) αBγ1
α unionsq βBγ2
We aim at showing that the assumptions above are enough to conclude that the factory is
able to realize the production of both γ1 and γ2:
3 (((α · α) unionsq α) · β) ;αBγ1 ;α unionsq βBγ2 ` 3 (γ1 · γ2).
Notice that the following is an instance of 3σ ∧ σBpi → 3pi, and hence is derivable using
the rule BDR:
3 (((α · α) unionsq α) · β) ; ((α · α) unionsq α) · βBγ1 · γ2 ` 3 (γ1 · γ2).
Hence, modulo cut and left weakening, it is enough to show that
αBγ1 ;α unionsq βBγ2 ` ((α · α) unionsq α) · βBγ1 · γ2.
Notice that:
...
proof for
R4
((α · α) unionsq α) · β ` (α · α) · β unionsq α · β
γ1 ` γ1 γ2 ` γ2
γ1  γ2 ` γ1 · γ2
γ1 · γ2 ` γ1 · γ2
(α · α) · β unionsq α · βBγ1 · γ2 ` ((α · α) unionsq α) · β·B ·γ1 · γ2
(α · α) · β unionsq α · βBγ1 · γ2 ` ((α · α) unionsq α) · βBγ1 · γ2
Hence, modulo cut and left weakening, it is enough to show that
αBγ1 ;α unionsq βBγ2 ` (α · α) · β unionsq α · βBγ1 · γ2.
Indeed, a derivation for the sequent above is:
... pi1
αBγ1 ;α unionsq βBγ2 ` α · (α unionsq β)Bγ1 · γ2
... pi2
α · (α unionsq β)Bγ1 · γ2 ` (α · α) · β unionsq α · βBγ1 · γ2
αBγ1 ;α unionsq βBγ2 ` (α · α) · β unionsq α · βBγ1 · γ2
where pi1 is the following derivation:
α ` α γ1 ` γ1
αBγ1 ` α·B ·γ1
α ·N·αBγ1 ` γ1
α ` α β ` β
α unionsq β ` α , β
α unionsq β ` α unionsq β γ2 ` γ2
α unionsq βBγ2 ` α unionsq β·B ·γ2
(α unionsq β) ·N·α unionsq βBγ2 ` γ2
(α ·N·αBγ1) (α unionsq β) ·N·α unionsq βBγ2 ` γ1 · γ2
Scalab
α (α unionsq β) ·N· (αBγ1 ;α unionsq βBγ2) ` γ1 · γ2
αBγ1 ;α unionsq βBγ2 ` α (α unionsq β)·B ·γ1 · γ2
α (α unionsq β) ` αBγ1 ;α unionsq βBγ2 ·I· γ1 · γ2
α · (α unionsq β) ` αBγ1 ;α unionsq βBγ2 ·I· γ1 · γ2
αBγ1 ;α unionsq βBγ2 ` α · (α unionsq β)·B ·γ1 · γ2
αBγ1 ;α unionsq βBγ2 ` α · (α unionsq β)Bγ1 · γ2
and pi2 is the following derivation:
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α ` α
α Φ ` α
Φ ` αm α
α ` αm α
α α ` α
α · α ` α
α · α β ` α
(α · α · β ` α
α ` α
α Φ ` α
Φ ` αm α
α ` αm α
α α ` α
α β ` α
α · β ` α
α · β ` α , β
α · β ` α unionsq β
(α · α · β) unionsq (α · β) ` α · (α unionsq β)
γ1 ` γ1 γ2 ` γ2
γ1  γ2 ` γ1 · γ2
γ1 · γ2 ` γ1 · γ2
α · (α unionsq β)Bγ1 · γ2 ` (α · α · β) unionsq α · β·B ·γ1 · γ2
α · (α unionsq β)Bγ1 · γ2 ` (α · α · β) unionsq α · βBγ1 · γ2
§6. Conclusions and further directions.
Resources and capabilities. In the present paper, a logical framework is introduced aimed at
capturing and reasoning about resource flow within organizations. This framework contributes
to the line of investigation of the logics of agency (cf. e.g. [28, 29, 30, 4, 10]) by focusing
specifically on the resource-dimension of agents’ (cap)abilities (e.g. to use resources to achieve
goals, to transform resources into other resources, and to coordinate the use of resources with
other agents). Formally, the logic of resources and capabilities (LRC) has been introduced in
a language consisting of formula-terms and resource-terms. Besides pure-formula and pure-
resource connectives, the language of LRC includes connectives bridging the two types in
various ways. Although action-terms are not included in LRC, perhaps the logical system of
which LRC is most reminiscent is the logic of capabilities introduced in [71], which formalizes
the capabilities of agents to perform actions. Indeed, looking past the differences between
the two formalisms deriving from the inherent differences between actions and resources, the
focus of both axiomatizations is interaction, between (cap)abilities and actions in [71], and
between (cap)abilities and resources in the present paper. Precisely its focus on interaction
makes it worthwhile to recast the logical framework of [71] in a multi-type environment.
A study in algebraic proof theory. The main technical contribution of the paper is the intro-
duction of the multi-type calculus D.LRC. The definition of this calculus and the proofs of
its basic properties hinge on the integration of two theories in algebraic logic and structural
proof theory—namely, unified correspondence and multi-type calculi—which originated inde-
pendently of each other. This integration contributes to the research program of algebraic
proof theory [13, 11], to which the results of the present paper pertain. Specifically, the rules
of D.LRC are introduced, and their soundness proved, by applying (and adapting) the ALBA-
based methodology of [44] (cf. also [12] for a purely proof-theoretic perspective on the same
methodology); cut elimination is proved ‘Belnap-style’, by verifying that D.LRC satisfies the
assumptions of the cut elimination metatheorem for multi-type calculi of [33]; conservativity
is proved following the general proof strategy for conservativity illustrated in [44], to which
the canonicity of the axioms of the Hilbert-style presentation of LRC is key.
It is perhaps worth stressing that the theory of proper display calculi developed in [44]
cannot be applied directly to the Hilbert-style presentation of LRC, for two reasons. Firstly,
the setting of [44] is a pure-formula setting, while the setting of the present paper is multi-
type. However, the results of [44] can be ported to the multi-type setting (as done also in
[36, 45, 46]); indeed, the algorithm ALBA and the definition of analytic inductive inequalities
are grounded in the order-theoretic properties of the algebraic interpretations of the logical
connectives, and remain fundamentally unchanged when applied to maps with the required
order-theoretic properties, irrespective of whether these maps are operations on one algebra or
between different algebras. The second, more serious reason is that the algebraic interpretation
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of the capability connective B is a map which reverses finite joins in its first coordinate but
is only monotone (rather than finitely meet-preserving) in its second coordinate. Hence, (the
multi-type version of) the definition of (analytic) inductive inequalities given in [44] does not
apply to many axioms of the Hilbert-style presentation of LRC, and hence some results (e.g.
the canonicity results of Section 2.3) could not be immediately inferred by directly applying
the general theory. However, as we saw in Section 4.1, the algorithm ALBA is successful on the
LRC axiomatization, which suggests the possibility of generalizing these results to arbitrary
multi-type signatures in which operations are allowed to be only monotone or antitone in some
coordinates. Moreover, unified correspondence theory covers various settings, from general
lattice-based propositional logics [21, 17, 18, 22], to regular [61] and monotone modal logics
[37], (distributive) lattice-based mu-calculi [16, 14, 15], hybrid logic [26] and many-valued
logic [52]. It would be interesting to investigate whether structural proof calculi for each of
these settings (or for multi-type logics based on them) could be defined by suitably extending
the techniques employed in the design of D.LRC.
Proof-theoretic formalizations of social behaviour. In Section 5, we have discussed the for-
malization of situations revolving around some instances of resource flow. These situations
have been captured as inferences or sequents in the language of LRC, and derived in the basic
calculus D.LRC or in some of its analytic extensions. This proof-theoretic analysis makes
it possible to single out the steps and assumptions which are essential to a given situation.
For instance, thanks to this analysis, it is clear that the full power of classical logic is not
essential to any case study we treated. In fact, as can be readily verified by inspection, many
derivations treated in Section 5 need less than the full power of intuitionistic logic, which is
the propositional base of LRC. Also, reasoning from assumptions in a given proof-theoretic
environment corresponds semantically to reasoning on all the models of that environment
satisfying those assumptions. This is a safer practice than e.g. starting out with an ad-hoc
model, since it makes it impossible to rely on some implicit assumption or other extra feature
of a chosen model.
The pure-resource fragment. In Section 2.1 we mentioned that the fact that 1 coincides with
the weakest resource entails (and is in fact equivalent to) the validity of the sequents α ·β ` α
and α · β ` β, which in some contexts seems too restrictive. How to relax this restriction is
current work in progress. However, this restriction brings also some advantages. Indeed, as
discussed earlier on in Section 2.1, this restriction makes the pure resource fragment of LRC
very similar to (the exponential-free fragment of) linear affine logic, which, unlike general
linear logic, is decidable [50, 58]. Hence, this leaves open the question of the decidability of
LRC (see also below).
Agents as first-class citizens. In the present paper, we focused on the basic setting of LRC, and
for the sake of not overloading notation and machinery, we have treated agents as parameters.
However, a fully multi-type treatment would include terms of type Ag (agents) in the language,
as done e.g. in [34]. This will be particularly relevant to the formalization of organization
theory, where terms of type Ag will represent members of an organization, and Ag might
be endowed with additional structure: for instance it can be a graph (capturing networks
of agents), or a partial order (capturing hierarchies), or partitioned in coalitions or teams.
Having agents as first-class citizens of the language will also make possible to attribute roles
to them, analogously to the way roles are attributed to resources in Section 5.3. Roles in turn
could provide concrete handles towards the modelling of agent coordination.
Group capabilities. Closely related to the issue of the previous paragraph is the formalization
of various forms of group capabilities. This theme is particularly relevant to organization
theory, since it might help to capture e.g. the contribution of leadership to the results of
an organization, versus the advantages of self-organization. Another interesting notion in
organization theory which could benefit from a formal theory of group capabilities is tacit
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group knowledge [68], emerging from the individual capabilities to adapt, often implicitly, to
the behaviour of others.
Different types of resources. Key to the analysis of the case study of Section 5.2 was the
interplay between reusable and non-reusable resources. The treatment of this case study
suggests that analytic extensions of D.LRC can be used to develop a formal theory of resource
flow that also captures other differences between resources (e.g. storable vs. non storable,
scalable vs. non scalable), their interaction, direct or mediated by agents, in the production
process, or in facilitating more generally the competitive success of the organization [57].
Pre-orderings on resources. In Section 5.3, we mentioned that the resources the agents possess
at the end of the story cannot be used without those they possess at the beginning, while these
can be used on their own. This observation suggest that alternative or additional orderings of
resources can be considered and studied, such as the ‘dependence’ preorder between resources,
which might be relevant to the analysis of some situations.
Comparing capabilities. The logic LRC provides a formal environment where to explore the
consequences for organizations of some agent’s being more capable than some other agent
at bringing about a certain state of affairs. In this environment, we can express that agent
a is at least as capable than agent b at bringing about A e.g. when αBaA and βBbA, and
β ` α (i.e. to bring about the same state of affairs, b uses a resource which is at least as
powerful as, possibly more powerful than, the resource used by a). Ricardo’s economic theory
of comparative advantage with regard to the division of labour in organizations [65] can be
formalized on the basis of capabilities differentials.
Algebraic canonicity and relational semantics. The theory of canonical extensions provides a
way to extract relational semantics from the algebraic semantics via algebraic canonicity. In
Section 2.3, we have shown that the logic LRC is complete w.r.t. perfect LRC-algebraic models.
Via standard discrete Stone-type duality, perfect LRC-algebraic models can be associated with
set-based structures similar to Kripke models, thus providing complete relational semantics
for LRC. The specification of this relational semantics and its properties is part of future
work.
Semantics of Petri nets. We are currently studying Petri nets as an alternative semantic
framework for LRC. In particular, the reachability problem for finite Petri nets is equivalent
to the deducibility problem for sequents in finitely axiomatized theory in the pure-tensor
fragment of linear logic [56, 69]. More recently, [31] proved completeness for several versions
of linear logic w.r.t. Petri nets. We are investigating similar issues in the setting of LRC.
Decidability, finite model property, complexity. The computational properties of LRC such as
decidability and complexity are certainly of interest. In particular, two, in general distinct,
problems are to be considered: the decidability of the set of theorems, and the decidability of
the (finite) consequence relation.13
A standard argument establishing decidability is via the so-called finite model property
(FMP), i.e. proving that any non-theorem can be refuted in a finite structure. Together with
finite axiomatizability and completeness of the underlying logic, FMP entails the decidability
of the set of theorems. For the second problem a stronger property is needed: the finite
embeddability property, which can be seen as the finite model property for quasi-identities
and, together with finite axiomatizability and completeness, entails the decidability of the
finite consequence relation of the underlying logic.
We wish to stress that the decidability problems for LRC subsume the complexity and
decidability of certain substructural logics. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the pure-resource
fragment of LRC is similar to (propositional, exponential-free) linear affine logic, which essen-
tially coincides with the distributive Full Lambek calculus with weakening, a logic for which
13The two problems coincide in presence of deduction theorem, which is available in intuitionistic logic and for
the formula-fragment of LRC, but not for the pure-resource fragment of LRC.
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the finite consequence relation, and hence the set of theorems, are known to be decidable (see
[59, 58]); FEP for integral residuated groupoids has been proved in [7], for a simple proof
of FEP in the distributive setting see also [47], where a coNEXP upper bound is obtained.
We hope we can use the algebraic semantics of LRC to investigate, and hopefully establish
decidability of LRC and its variants using FMP or FEP.
Syntactic decidability. An alternative path towards decidability for LRC consists in adapt-
ing the techniques developed in [50], where a syntactic proof is given of the decidability of
full propositional affine linear logic, by showing that it is enough to consider sequents in a
suitable normal form. An encouraging hint is the fact that the full Lambek calculus with
weakening is decidable [58, 59]. However, it is also known that, for certain substructural
logics, distributivity is problematic for decidability.
Appendix A. Proper multi-type calculi and their cut elimination. In the present
section, we report on the Belnap-style meta-theorem that we appeal to in order to show that
the calculus introduced in Section 3 enjoys cut elimination. This meta-theorem was proven in
[33] for the so-called proper multi-type calculi. In order to make the exposition self-contained,
in what follows we will report the definition of proper multi-type calculi and the statement of
the meta-theorem.
Definition A.1. A sequent x ` y is type-uniform if x and y are of the same type T (cf.
[34, Definition 3.1]).
Definition A.2. A proper multi-type calculus is any calculus in a multi-type language
satisfying the following list of conditions:14
C1: Preservation of operational terms. Each operational term occurring in a premise
of an inference rule inf is a subterm of some operational term in the conclusion of inf.
C2: Shape-alikeness of parameters. Congruent parameters (i.e. non-active terms in the
application of a rule) are occurrences of the same structure.
C′2: Type-alikeness of parameters. Congruent parameters have exactly the same type.
This condition bans the possibility that a parameter changes type along its history.
C3: Non-proliferation of parameters. Each parameter in an inference rule inf is con-
gruent to at most one constituent in the conclusion of inf.
C4: Position-alikeness of parameters. Congruent parameters are either all precedent
or all succedent parts of their respective sequents. In the case of calculi enjoying the display
property, precedent and succedent parts are defined in the usual way (see [3]). Otherwise,
these notions can still be defined by induction on the shape of the structures, by relying on
the polarity of each coordinate of the structural connectives.
C′5: Quasi-display of principal constituents. If an operational term a is principal in
the conclusion sequent s of a derivation pi, then a is in display, unless pi consists only of its
conclusion sequent s (i.e. s is an axiom).
C′′5: Display-invariance of axioms. If a is principal in an axiom s, then a can be isolated
by applying Display Postulates and the new sequent is still an axiom.
C′′′5 : Closure of axioms under surgical cut. If (x ` y)([a]pre, [a]suc), a ` z[a]suc and
v[a]pre ` a are axioms, then (x ` y)([a]pre, [z/a]suc) and (x ` y)([v/a]pre, [a]suc) are again
axioms.
C′6: Closure under substitution for succedent parts within each type. Each rule
is closed under simultaneous substitution of arbitrary structures for congruent operational
terms occurring in succedent position, within each type.
14See [35] for a discussion on C′5 and C
′′
5 .
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C′7: Closure under substitution for precedent parts within each type. Each rule
is closed under simultaneous substitution of arbitrary structures for congruent operational
terms occurring in precedent position, within each type.
Condition C′6 (and likewise C′7) ensures, for instance, that if the following inference is an
application of the rule R:
(x ` y)([a]suci | i ∈ I)
R
(x′ ` y′)[a]suc
and
(
[a]suci | i ∈ I
)
represents all and only the occurrences of a in the premiss which are
congruent to the occurrence of a in the conclusion (if I = ∅, then the occurrence of a in the
conclusion is congruent to itself), then also the following inference is an application of the
same rule R:
(x ` y)([z/a]suci | i ∈ I)
R
(x′ ` y′)[z/a]suc
where the structure z is substituted for a.
This condition caters for the step in the cut elimination procedure in which the cut needs
to be “pushed up” over rules in which the cut-formula in succedent position is parametric
(cf. [33, Section 4]).
C′8: Eliminability of matching principal constituents. This condition requests a stan-
dard Gentzen-style checking, which is now limited to the case in which both cut formulas are
principal, i.e. each of them has been introduced with the last rule application of each corre-
sponding subdeduction. In this case, analogously to the proof Gentzen-style, condition C′8
requires being able to transform the given deduction into a deduction with the same conclusion
in which either the cut is eliminated altogether, or is transformed in one or more applications
of the cut rule, involving proper subterms of the original operational cut-term. In addition to
this, specific to the multi-type setting is the requirement that the new application(s) of the
cut rule be also strongly type-uniform (cf. condition C10 below).
C9: Type-uniformity of derivable sequents. Each derivable sequent is type-uniform.
C10: Preservation of type-uniformity of cut rules. All cut rules preserve type-uniformity.
In the context of proper multi-type calculi we say that a rule is analytic if it satisfies
conditions C1-C
′
7 of the list above. Analytic rules can be added to a given proper multi-type
calculus, and the resulting calculus enjoys cut elimination and subformula property.
We state the cut-elimination metatheorem which we appeal to when establishing the cut
elimination for the calculus introduced in Section 3.
Theorem A.3. Any calculus satisfying C2, C
′
2, C
′
3, C4, C
′′′
5 , C
′′′′
5 , C
′
6, C
′
7, C
′
8, C
′′
8, C9 and
C10 is cut-admissible. If also C1 is satisfied, then the calculus enjoys the subformula property.
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